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1. INTRODUCTION
The United States' technological leadership in the world market-
place has gradually eroded within the last two decades,' prompting in-
creased efforts towards the development of new strategies to maintain
U.S. competitiveness.2 The United States' comparative advantage has
notably slipped in industries such as microelectronics and optical com-
munications.' However, it remains highly competitive in knowledge-
* J.D. Candidate, 1989, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A. 1986, Wel-
lesley College.
1 See generally Llana, Is Our Telecom Infrastructure on the Block? NETWORK
WORLD, Jan. 9, 1989, at 32; Andrews, A Foreign Push for U.S. Patents, N.Y. Times,
June 4, 1989, § 3, at 4, col. 2.
" Communications and Computers in the 21st Century: Hearing Before the Tech-
nology Policy Task Force of the Comm. on Science, Space, and Technology, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1987) (statement of Richard Nelson, Henry R. Luce Professor of
International Political Economics, School of International Public Affairs, Columbia
University) [hereinafter Communications and Computers in the 21st Century]. See
also Technology and Economics in a Shrinking World: Hearing Before the Technology
Task Force of the Comm. on Science, Space, and Technology, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987) [hereinafter Technology and Economics in a Shrinking World]; Small Business
and High Technology: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on General Oversight and the
Economy of the Comm. on Small Business, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION IN SERVICES 17 (1987)
[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL COMPETrION IN SERVICES].
- Communications and Computers in the 21st Century, supra note 2, at 27 (testi-
mony of Larry W. Sumney, President, Semiconductor Research Corporation); Betts,
High-Tech a Non-Issue in '88, COMPUTERWORLD, Nov. 7, 1988, at 155. While there
is no single cause for the general decline of U.S. international competitiveness in vari-
ous industries, it has been posited that structural changes in the world economy, result-
ing in large part from postwar U.S. foreign policy, have played a primary role in that
decline.
One of the major objectives of U.S. foreign economic policy during the postwar
period has been to help other nations, including lesser developed countries, build up
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based sectors such as computer software,4 which has been targeted as
one of several industries having the greatest potential impact on U.S.
international competitiveness.'
Increased dependency upon and demand for computer products
has sparked a rapidly growing interest in this industry worldwide. De-
veloping countries such as Singapore and Taiwan have begun to em-
phasize software development in their programs for technological pro-
gress, while industrialized nations such as West Germany have shifted
government research funding from hardware to software.6 Nonetheless,
the United States remains the undisputed world leader in software de-
their economies and develop technologically. For instance, in the 1950s the transfer of
U.S. technology through heavy direct investment helped Europe rebuild, while during
the 1970s South Korean construction companies learned their trade in Vietnam or the
Middle East, where they worked with U.S. firms. In less than 10 years, South Korean
exports of these services grew phenomenally, from $83 million in 1972 to almost $14
billion by 1981. Technology and Economics in a Shrinking World, supra note 2, at 28
(statement of John A. Alic, Senior Associate, Office of Technology Assessment). U.S.
technological assistance promoted increased technical competence in other countries,
while simultaneously altering its competitive position with foreign firms. U.S. firms
subsequently found themselves in a more international and open trading market in
which it has become more difficult to compete.
- Computer products are broadly classified in two categories, hardware and
software. Computer hardware refers to the physical machinery, i.e., the computer ter-
minal and keyboard, whereas software refers to the machine-readable programs that
instruct the computer to perform functions for the user. Davidson, Protecting Computer
Software: A Comprehensive Analysis, 23 JuRIMETRICS J. 337, 340 n.1 (1983).
Computer hardware has become less important as a target of development than
software. This is due, in part, to the enormous cost-cutting potential and strategic ap-
plications available for software users, as well as the possibility of "multiplying the
productivity increments in industries not currently served by software applications."
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION IN SERVICES, supra note 2, at 17. In addition, there is
the growing awareness that "U.S. competitiveness in computer hardware, and indeed in
all high-technology industries, increasingly depends on software." Id. (italics omitted).
Computer hardware technology "[has] developed greatly through advances in semicon-
ducter technology which are little short of phenomenal; but what the hardware can do
depends on the software. It seems that a 'software age' has dawned, and that there is
little prospect for future development without software strength." Hirakawa, Software
Agreement Signed Between IBM and Two Compatible Machine Builders, INDUSTRIAL
REVIEW OF JAPAN 1984 56 [hereinafter Software Agreement Signed].
Due to the current downward trend of the U.S. economy and the falling dollar,
financial analysts diverge in their predictions on how technology, i.e., computer hard-
ware, concerns will fare. While the profit margins of even the leaders could suffer, the
larger software developers, such as Microsoft, a maker of "sophisticated operating
software," are viewed by some as "recession-proof" since "[elvery new or old IBM
machine will have to have its software." Sandler, Outlook for Technology Stocks in
1988 Causes Bewilderment and Analyses Aren't Much Help, Wall St. J., Dec. 31,
1987, at 31, col. 2.
5 INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION IN SERVICES, supra note 2, at 17. U.S. firms
are also highly competitive in the fields of telecommunications, data processing and
information services. Id. at 16. See also Rifkin, Software Is the Next Target, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 15, 1989, § 3, at 2, col. 2.
6 Id. at 17.
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velopment. Statistics indicate that U.S.-based firms controlled about
seventy percent of the world software market in 1985, earning some
twenty-one billion dollars in revenues. 7 It is predicted, however, that
this lead will inevitably narrow as Japan seeks to develop software ap-
plications8 that will enable its computer manufacturers to more effec-
tively penetrate world markets.'
7 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, TECHNOLOGY AND THE AMERICAN Ec-
ONOMIC TRANSITION: CHOICES FOR THE FUTURE 333 (1988) [hereinafter TECHNOL-
OGY AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC TRANSITION].
' Earlier this decade, it was thought that Japanese software developers lacked the
requisite expertise to develop software "in the same profusion as it [was] being devel-
oped in the United States." Note, Protections for Software Under U.S. and Japanese
Law: A Comparative Analysis, 7 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 353, 555-56 (1984)
[hereinafter Protections for Software]. As one commentator explained, this may have
been due to a language barrier; since "most programming languages such as COBOL
do not readily lend themselves to translation into Japanese, . . . in order to become
proficient programmers, Japanese software developers must first be fluent speakers of
English." Id. n.20 (citing Yoshio, Technological Transfer: Grafted or Potted, 7 JAPAN
ECHO 25 (1980)).
The surge of Japanese activity in this area indicates that this "setback" is no
longer a hindrance. For instance, in 1983, two of Japan's major manufacturers,
Fujitsu, Ltd. and Hitachi, Ltd., entered into an agreement to "restrict business activi-
ties of the two companies as they [had] been expanding their shares of the domestic
market by manufacturing IBM-compatible machines which could use application
software originally designed for IBM equipment." Software Agreement Signed, supra
note 4, at 56. Since then, numerous disputes have arisen between U.S. and Japanese
software manufacturers for various forms of infringement, indicating Japan's rapid ad-
vancement in the industry. See Miller, U.S. Software Firms Complain Fujitsu Gained
Edge in IBM Copyright Decision, Wall St. J., Oct. 7, 1987, at 4, col. 2.
In fact, Japanese advancement has so progressed that reciprocating licenses issued
from Japanese software manufacturers to U.S. companies and alliances with Japanese
firms are now highly sought after by U.S. firms. See Rehfeld, Forming Global Alli-
ances, PERSONAL COMPUTING, Oct. 1988, at 292; Reduced Trade Tensions Sought,
Wash. Post, Aug. 1, 1985, at El, col. 2.
9 INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION IN SERVICES, supra note 2, at 17. See also
TECHNOLOGY AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC TRANSITION, supra note 7, at 333.
Although European firms currently have the second most competitive software industry
after the United States, a more significant threat is seen as coming from across the
Pacific, with Japan in the forefront. Id. See also Ruhl, MCC and Other Research
Clubs: Do They Work?, ELECTRONIC BUSINESS, Dec. 10, 1988, at 17. The National
Research Council cautions that the United States "cannot afford to be complacent
about its computer technology strengths . . . on an assumption of an invincible lead,"
noting that "as the computer market becomes increasingly global, U.S. firms face in-
creasing foreign competition." U.S. Advised to Revamp Export Curbs, L.A. Times,
Dec. 30, 1988, § 4, at 2, col. 1.
Japan has already clearly demonstrated its ability in manufacturing industries. It
is believed that Japanese improvement in services such as software "will follow, if at
first only to meet Japan's own needs and to take advantage of the "country's expanding
hardware base." INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION IN SERVICES, supra note 2, at 7-8.
Another advantage favoring Japan is the fact that its government is "more attuned
than those of Western governments to the needs and consequences of the shift toward
an information-centered economy." Id. at 8-9. Government officials are working on
moving the Japanese economy away from an emphasis on the manufacture of consumer
durables to a focus on knowledge-based technology services. Id.
1989]
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According to a recent study by the U.S. Office of Technology As-
sessment, continued U.S. competitiveness will depend upon changes in
U.S. technology policy, beginning with a shift in attitude toward for-
eign know-how."0 The United States no longer occupies a seat as the
primary technology source for the rest of the world, as the sophistica-
tion of foreign technology often matches that of the United States. It
can, in fact, now learn from the other nations. Technology transfers,
which are most commonly conducted through the highly favored licens-
ing mechanism,"1 will necessarily become more reciprocal as U.S. com-
panies seek to achieve a "more balanced two-way flow" by becoming
"more aggressive in locating and acquiring foreign know-how[.]"'"
Recent years, however, have seen what some perceived to be a
threat to the continued viability of software and other forms of technol-
ogy licensing in the United States. Despite U.S. leadership in software
development, wary industry leaders feared the loss of this position as a
result of the ambiguous application of the U.S. bankruptcy laws to
software licensing agreements.' 3 Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code'
4
allows a trustee or debtor-in-possession 5 of a bankrupt estate to reject
executory contracts'" such as software licenses. Upon rejection, the li-
censed material reverts to the debtor and becomes property of the es-
Lastly, steady increases in direct investment abroad by Japan, no doubt spurred on
by the appreciation of the yen against other currencies, will serve to facilitate Japanese
access to U.S. and European software technologies. Statistics indicate that the value of
Japanese investment abroad remained consistently below $1 billion until 1971, increas-
ing sharply thereafter. Between 1972 and 1980, direct investment abroad averaged be-
tween $2.3 to $5 billion. Between 1981 and 1985, investment averaged between $7.7
and $12.2 billion, passing the $10 billion point for the first time in 1984. Finally, in
1986, the annual value of investment abroad was recorded at over $20 billion.
Tsukazaki, Japanese Direct Investment Abroad, J. OF JAPANESE TRADE & INDUS.
(No. 4 1987) at 10.
"0 INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION IN SERVICES, supra note 2, at 18-19. See also
Technology And Economics in a Shrinking World, supra note 2, at 29 (statement of
John A. Alic, Senior Associate, Office of Technology Assessment).
11 See infra notes 23-35 and accompanying text.
12 INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION IN SERVICES, supra note 2, at 18-19 (empha-
sis added).
1 See infra text accompanying notes 36-57.
1 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1982).
15 A trustee is normally assigned in a Chapter 7 (liquidation) bankruptcy to ad-
minister the bankrupt estate by collecting and reducing property of the estate to cash
and making distributions to creditors as provided in 11 U.S.C. §§ 507, 726 (1982). In a
Chapter 11 (reorganization) bankruptcy, the company or partnership is "preserved as a
going business concern." Drabkin & Brooks, Special Problems in Computer Industry
Bankruptcies and Workouts, in 1987 LICENSING LAW HANDBOOK: COMPUTER
SOFTWARE DISTRIBUTION & ACQUISITION ISSUE, 12-1, 12-26 (D.C. Toedt, 3d ed.
1987) [hereinafter Drabkin]. In a Chapter 11 proceeding, the licensor/debtor-in-pos-
session is accorded protection under the bankruptcy laws from creditors while it or-
ganizes a plan for the reorganization of its affairs. Id.
16 See infra text accompanying notes 58-89.
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tate.17 Where the debtor is licensor, rejection could have a potentially
detrimental effect upon the licensee's business if the licensee is deprived
of continued use of the program. This is particularly true if its profits
stem solely from the use of the licensed material.1 8 Although an injured
licensee can recover monetary damages, they are usually inadaquate
compensation for the ruin of a profitable enterprise.19
In the seminal 1985 case, Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond
Metal Finishers, Inc.," the Fourth Circuit affirmed a trustee's power
to reject a technology license where the trustee demonstrates that, in his
business judgment, continuation of the agreement would not benefit the
debtor-licensor's estate. The court's holding and the potential of further
erosion of U.S. competitiveness created an outcry among technology in-
dustry leaders who viewed the decision as "threat[ing] an end to the
system of licensing of intellectual property ...that has evolved over
many years to the mutual benefit of both the licensor and licensee and
to the country's indirect benefits. 2 1 Because the ambiguity provided
U.S. licensees no assurance of the continued use of the license in the
event of licensor bankruptcy, the high-tech industry envisioned a poten-
tially chilling effect upon licensing activity with both domestic and for-
eign licensees.
The potential of further disruption to the valuable technology li-
censing system prompted a coalition of industry leaders, led by the
"1 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1982). Under § 541(a), an estate is automatically created
upon the filing of a petition in bankruptcy. Property of the estate includes "all legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case." 11
U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). See also HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, BANKRUPTCY AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AMENDMENTS, H.R. REP. No. 1012, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
3 (1988) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 1012].
18 The range of licensing transactions vary greatly. However, there are two com-
mon arrangements. First, a licensor may license out an applications software package
that controls daily business functions of the licensee's operation such as payroll, ac-
counting, production and inventory. Conley & Bryan, Software Escrow in Bankruptcy:
An International Perspective, 10 N.C. J. INT'L & CoM. REc,. 579, 579 (1985) [here-
inafter Conley]. Second, a licensor may license out an idea in the form of object code,
allowing the licensee to develop its own product using the object code as a basis for its
invention. Note, Rejection of Computer Software Licensing Agreements in Bankruptcy,
8 CARDOZo L. REV. 361, 364 (1986) [hereinafter Rejection of Computer Software].
19 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (1982). After a contract is rejected, the licensee can file for
damages as a general unsecured creditor. Monetary damages, however, may not ade-
quately compensate for losses suffered as a result of rejection because they will be paid
at the same pro-rata level as payments made to the other general unsecured creditors.
See Rejection of Computer Software, supra note 18, at 380-81.
20 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nom. Lubrizol Enterprises,
Inc. v. Canfield, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986).
21 SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BANKRUPrCY
PROTECTION ACT, S. REP. No. 505, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1988) [hereinafter S.
REP. No. 505].
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computer industry, to persuade Congress to amend section 365 of the
Bankruptcy Code. The Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Protection Act
was signed into law on October 18, 1988. The Act amends section 365
by adding a new provision, section 365(n), which specifically addresses
technology licenses in bankruptcy.
While the concerns that prompted the amendment of section 365
were not unfounded, the industry fears which led to this response may
have been premature. This Comment considers the potential effects of
section 365(n) on the software licensing mechanism. Part 2 will present
a brief overview of software licensing.22 Part 3 will discuss the histori-
cal treatment of executory contracts under section 365 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. This is followed by a brief survey of the judicial treat-
ment of executory software/technology licenses in Part 4, which
questions the immediacy of the threat posed by Lubrizol. In Part 5, the
legislative background and provisions of section 365(n) are described.
Part 6 analyzes the amendment, discussing its general effects and inter-
national business implications. Part 7 concludes that section 365(n)
may not have been the ideal solution because it is unbalanced and
overcompensates for the inequities that existed in the system. As a re-
sult, section 365(n) could have the potential chilling effect on software
licensing it sought to avoid and do little to enhance U.S. competitiveness
worldwide.
2. OVERVIEW: THE SOFTWARE LICENSING DILEMMA
2.1 Why License?
Of the methods by which technology may be transferred, licensing
provides the most agreeable mechanism for the parties involved and
maximizes the widespread use of intellectual property. It is a highly
favored method of accessing international markets,23 particularly by
22 Although this Comment deals specifically with software licenses, the concepts
discussed are similarly applicable to other types of technology licenses.
21 Some of the reasons businesses have entered foreign licensing agreements are:
(1) Licensing permits entry into foreign markets without large capital
outlays. It is, therefore, a favorite device for small and medium-sized
companies.
(2) Returns are apt to be more rapidly realized than in the case of
manufacturing ventures.
(3) The income from foreign licensing helps to underwrite costly re-
search programs.
(4) Licensing enables a firm to retain markets otherwise lost by im-
port restrictions or because it is being outpriced.
(5) Licensing can be used to test a foreign market and then to service
it without costly additions to production or detracting from the supply
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small and mid-sized companies, because it does not require large capi-
tal outlays from the licensor and avoids the complications that can arise
from either exporting or direct investment. 4
Creators of new technology are often individuals or small busi-
nesses that do not possess the capital to fully develop and market an
idea, an expensive process that must proceed through a "risky series of
steps including research, development, manufacturing and market-
ing."25 Even the most established firms with superior manufacturing
capabilities and large capital bases, however, cannot develop all the best
ideas on their own. Often it is those "working alone at night in their
garages or living room [who] come up with some of the best [ideas]." 26
One method by which firms can obtain new technology is by
purchasing outright from its creator. This option has several draw-
backs. First, because firms will necessarily have to assume all the risks
involved with incorporating the idea into a product, they will not be
willing to pay a high price27 for an idea that may go nowhere.2 8 Sec-
ond, creators may be reluctant to sell their idea if it is their most valua-
available for local customers.
(6) Licensing permits a company to develop outlets for components of
other products and to build goodwill for other company products.
(7) Licensing enables a company to establish an operation in coun-
tries that will not permit the establishment of a local subsidiary controlled
by foreigners.
(8) Licensing is a two-way street which may permit the American
company to get access to a foreign company's technology and even acquire
a whole new product line without the delay and expense of development.
Travaglini, Foreign Licensing and Joint Venture Arrangements, 4 N.C. J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 159, 159-60 (1979). See also Mirabito, Technology Transfers of Patentl
Data Rights in the Commercial Sector: A Primer, 7 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 251,
255 (1984).
2 Travaglini, supra note 23, at 159. For instance, difficulties involving trade bar-
riers, transportation costs and product design or distribution can arise when exporting.
Id. Direct investment, once a popular form of investment abroad, is no longer ideal due
to the increasing reluctance of foreign governments to permit the establishment of
wholly-foreign-owned plants in their countries. Technology and Economics in a
Shrinking World, supra note 2, at 24 (statement of John A. Alic, Senior Associate,
Office of Technology Assessment). Direct investment also requires a commitment of
capital that a company may not be able nor wish to make.
25 S. REP. No. 505, supra note 21, at 3.
26 Intellectual Property Contracts in Bankruptcy: Hearing on H.R. 4657 before
the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1988) (testimony of James Burger, Chief Counsel, Ap-
ple Computer, Inc.) [hereinafter H.R. 4657].
27 Outright sale is also an unattractive option for licensees who may want "to
exploit the intellectual property in only a single field of use, and [are] unwilling or
unable to pay a higher price to obtain the right for all fields of use." Id. at 84 (state-
ment of Harry F. Manbeck, Intellectual Property Owners, Inc.).
2 Id. at 20 (testimony of James Burger).
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ble asset.29 Those who do choose to sell their ideas part with ownership
of them. This not only deprives the creator of any further control over
the disposition of his invention, but greatly minimizes the financial re-
wards he can potentially reap. Third, outright sale can prevent the effi-
cient use of intellectual property by restricting the number of parties
who can develop the idea in other fields of use."0
Another method of obtaining new ideas is through an assignment.
An assignment transfers all of the creator/assignor's rights in the idea
or invention to the firm/assignee. It grants a proprietary interest in the
idea "sufficient to allow the [assignee] to sue a third party infringer in
the [assignee's] own name" for the term of the assignment.3 ' This ar-
rangement is akin to a temporary sale; the assignee essentially "owns"
the invention for the assignment's term, and the assignor is "either to-
tally alienated from his creation or, at best, given a license by the as-
signee." 2 The inherent drawbacks to this approach, which are similar
to those associated with outright sales, are seen as creating a disincen-
tive for licensors and the development of intellectual property.
33
The licensing mechanism allows both parties to benefit. The crea-
tor can test the value of his idea and share the risks and rewards with
the firm providing the funding and refinement necessary to produce an
economically successful product.3 4 At the same time, the creator retains
control over and ownership of the idea. Licensing also enables the crea-
tor to make the most efficient use of his idea by leasing it out in as
many geographical areas or fields of use for which there are
applications.85
2.2 The Software Licensing Framework
In the basic software licensing arrangement, whether foreign or
domestic, the licensor grants the licensee the right to use software for a
limited time period.36 The licensee's right of use may be exclusive or
2 Id. at 84 (statement of Harry F. Manbeck).
s S. REP. No. 505, supra note 21, at 4.
S Tamietti, Technology Licenses Under The Bankruptcy Code: A Licensee's Mine
Field, 62 AM. BANKR. L.J. 295, 302 (1988). For a detailed discussion of technology
assignments and their recovery in bankruptcy, see id. at 303-10.
11 S. REP. No. 505, supra note 21, at 4.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 3.
:5 Id.
'6 Licensing arrangements will differ depending on the nature of the material
leased out. Generally, there are three techniques in which software is licensed: mass
marketing; large markets with continuing services; and custom servicing. Each involves
a different type of software. Rejection of Computer Software, supra note 18, at 366-74.
Ordinary off-the-shelf sales in a retail store are an example of mass marketing.
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non-exclusive.17 In exchange, the licensor receives a set fee or a negoti-
ated percentage of the licensee's profits that derive from the use of the
licensed software.3 8 Each party must continue to perform its respective
obligatory duty, 9 which is laid out in the license agreement, for the
Software marketed in this manner is widely available to the general public. Most
software packages include a standard license "which purports to retain ownership in
the developer, granting to the purchaser only certain rights of use" on the packaging, in
the instructions and/or on the diskette itself. Id. at 366. Despite the presence of the
printed licenses, it is very difficult for the licensor to retain control over the product due
to the volume at which mass marketed software is produced and sold to the general
public. It would thus be uneconomical and administratively burdensome to monitor for
infringing users.
The large markets with continuing services category also involves large numbers of
licensed users. This category includes standardized software for activities such as busi-
ness accounting, which require minimum adaptations to suit the specific needs of a
particular licensee's business. Id. at 368. These licenses may include complex contrac-
tual arrangements which include a variety of duties required by both licensor and licen-
see. While there is a sufficient degree of obligation in this type of arrangement for the
contract to qualify as an executory contract, it is probably not to the licensor's benefit to
reject the license in bankruptcy due to the large number of licensees using the same or
a similar program. Id. at 370-71.
Customized software is created to accommodate the unique needs of the licensee.
Often, the licensee is the only one who is using the program. A special program
designed to control an aircraft's auto-pilot is one example of customized software. Id. at
371. The contractual arrangements are the same as those for standardized software, but
the risks to the licensee in the event of rejection in a bankruptcy proceeding are sub-
stantially greater. The licensee's business will undoubtedly be dependent upon the use
of the software and it will be difficult for it to find an immediate replacement due to
the software's exclusive nature. Id.
11 A licensee with an exclusive license has the right to use the licensed material to
the exclusion of all others, including the licensor himself. A less harsh option for the
licensor, with a lower standard of exclusivity, is one that grants the licensee the right to
exclude all persons from using the licensed intellectual property, with the exception of
the licensor. These licenses may be referred to as sole licenses. Lastly, a more common
arrangement is the non-exclusive license, which gives the licensee a right to use licensed
property, but no right to exclude others from using it. Wiesen, The Elements of a
Domestic License of Intellectual Property, in 9 A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE MATERIALS J.
55, 56 (1984).
38 For a more detailed discussion of these royalty arrangements, see id. at 63-67.
3,Obligatory duties are laid out in the contractual agreement along with the usual
elements of a licensing contract, including: provisions for its duration; grants of rights
to use, manufacture, and distribute the product or a product whose creation was based
on the use of the licensed material; and protection of rights that are subject to license,
grantback, or cross-licensing provisions. Travaglini, supra note 23, at 161-69. Obliga-
tions that commonly appear in licensing contracts include:
- convenants not to compete;
- agreements to refrain from raiding key employees;
- agreements not to reveal trade secrets acquired during the contractual period;
- agreements to indemnify users against patent and copyright infringements;
- agreements limiting the copies to be made;
- agreements to pay royalties;
- agreements to provide maintenance.
Drabkin, supra note 15.
Due to their international scope, foreign licensing agreements include many ele-
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term of the license. 40 In this type of arrangement, the licensor will usu-
ally distribute only the software program's object code to the licensee
and retain ownership of the source code.41
This arrangement places the licensee in an extremely vulnerable
position. Since the object code is unintelligible to the ordinary user, it
does not provide information regarding the program's nature. A licen-
see must therefore have access to the source code as well as the object
code in order to understand how the program runs. Access would be
particularly beneficial should an emergency, such as licensor bank-
ruptcy, arise because access would allow the licensee to provide for
ments which may be absent in domestic licenses such as choice of law, currency control,
and arbitration provisions. Travaglini, supra note 23, at 164. In an attempt to ensure
compliance with their standards, U.S. licensors may also require, through contractual
provision, the foreign licensee to allow access, test, and inspection rights at its facilities.
Id. It is not unusual to require licensees to provide the licensor with a sample of any
new product so that it may be inspected before it is manufactured and publicly distrib-
uted. Id.
Unlike licensing transactions which take place within the United States, it is diffi-
cult for a U.S. licensor to monitor and control the quality of the licensee's product. A
licensor may have an interest in monitoring the licensee's activities involving the li-
censed material in order to protect his idea, product, or compary's reputation. Thus,
licensing arrangements which involve parties based in another country often require
that any products derived from the licensed material "meet [the licensor's] standards of
quality and performance." Id. Defects or low-quality could potentially cause damage to
the licensor's reputation if the licensee's product becomes associated with the licensor.
Competition presents another problem. The danger here is "once a licensee has ac-
quired technical proficiency and a good market, pressure can build to terminate the
license or at least to revise it to the licensor's detriment." Id. at 160.
40 While there are many possible variations to this basic scheme, this Comment
focuses only upon licensing arrangements which involve an active and continuous rela-
tionship between the licensor and licensee as a result of contractual obligatory duties.
41 Computer programs are composed of source code and object code. The source
code is "the series of instructions to the computer program for carrying out the various
tasks which are performed by the program . . . ." SAS Inst., Inc. v. S & H Computer
Sys., Inc., 605 F. Supp. 816, 818 (M.D. Tenn. 1985). It is through the use of the
source code that software programs are written. The source code can be written in a
language similar to English which is generally understandable to those literate in com-
puter languages. Id. It can also be written without English, in symbolic language. Da-
vidson, supra note 4, at 341. Examples of English-equivalent computer languages are
BASIC and FORTRAN. SPL or direct machine language, on the other hand, consists
entirely of ones and zeros exemplifying symbolic language.
Programs written in source code must first be converted into object code by a
separate program called a "compiler" before a computer can carry out the instructions
it receives. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240,
1243 (3d Cir. 1983). The object code is stored on a memory device such as a floppy
disk, and is what a software purchaser receives. It facilitates the program's execution
and deters undesirable (from the developer's viewpoint) modifications by adventurous
buyers. Note, Defining the Scope of Copyright.Protection for Computer Software, 38
SrAN. L. REV. 497, 502 (1986). It is unintelligible to the ordinary user and cannot
provide him with any information concerning the nature of the program. Only the
source code can be of assistance to a user interested in discovering how the program
runs. Conley, supra note 18, at 581.
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himself any maintenance functions (i.e., debugging and updating)4" that
were originally the licensor's responsibility under the licensing agree-
ment.43 However, since licensors retain the source code, only they can
continue to properly maintain the software.44
Software licensors are reluctant to distribute the source code be-
cause it provides the key to deciphering, and potentially misappropriat-
ing, the original program.45 While the creation of a complex and inno-
vative software program requires substantial investments of time and
money, it takes only a fraction of this time and money to copy a pro-
gram. 46 Herein lies the danger. The source code enables a licensee to
copy the original program and possibly escape retribution from the li-
censor by adding a sufficient number of changes to the new program to
disguise the copying.47 Even if the licensee only uses the licensor's
42 Software is improved and enhanced periodically because it is easily adaptable
and modifiable. Unlike hardware maintenance, which involves replacing defective parts
and servicing in order to return the hardware to its original level of functionality,
software maintenance adds new capabilities. Martin & Deasy, Licensing of Intellectual
Property Rights Needed for Software Support: A Life Cycle Approach, 28
JURIMETRICS J. 223, 225 (1988). Thorough maintenance consists of three separate
functions: 1) corrective maintenance, which aims to correct errors in the software; this
is also known as debugging; 2) perfective maintenance, which improves the software to
respond to new user needs; and 3) adaptive maintenance, which changes the software,
enabling it to operate on a new operating system or on new hardware. Id. (citing B. P.
LIENTZ & E. B. SWANSON, SOFTWARE MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT 68 (1980)).
43 Conley, supra note 18, at 581.
4 Raysman & Brown, Source Code Escrow Agreements, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 10, 1984,
at 1, col. 1.
45 One commentator points out that the reluctance to distribute the source code to
licensees is a recent development. While the source code was freely distributed in the
beginning of the computer age "without any retention of intellectual property rights in
an effort to promote hardware sales . . . , [this changed] as the cost of hardware...
declined dramatically, [and] enormous investments [were] made in software develop-
ment." Conley, supra note 18, at 581 n.10.
46 Davidson, supra note 4, at 339. See also Rejection of Computer Software,
supra note 18, at 362.
47 Conley, supra note 18, at 581-82. Computer programs have been extended pro-
tection under U.S. copyright law since 1980. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 117 (1982).
See also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 523 (9th Cir.
1984); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1247-55 (3d
Cir. 1983). However, a copyright will only protect a work's (or a computer program's)
expression, and "in no case does copyright protection . . . extend to any idea, proce-
dure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless
of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work."
17 U.S.C. § 102(b). Courts have long maintained this idea/expression distinction in a
variety of contexts. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 100-01 (1879) (accounting
system held protected under copyright law where alleged infringer used original au-
thor's idea but expressed that idea in a different manner); Mattel, Inc. v. Arzak-
Hamway Int'l, Inc., 724 F.2d 357, 358-60 (2d Cir. 1983) (superhero dolls protected
since superhuman form is merely an idea and allegedly infringing dolls emphasized
muscle groups different from those accentuated in originals); Continental Casualty Co.
v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d 702, 705 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 816 (1958)
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"ideas, concepts, and programming methods for use in preparing a
competing program, the source code will be an invaluable reference
material." '48 Although licensors' software programs will usually be pro-
tected under some form of intellectual property law, namely, patent,49
(alleged infringer's insurance forms protected because underlying idea could only be
expressed in limited number of ways, which necessarily coincided with plaintiff's form
of expression, and to hold otherwise would prevent alleged infringer's expressing the
same idea); Original Appalachian Artworks v. Blue Box Factory, 577 F. Supp. 625
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("Cabbage Patch Doll" look-alikes held protectible due to differences
in body structure and skin texture).
Thus the particular way a software licensor expresses his idea in the program
cannot be copied by anyone (unless both his rights to the copyright as well as to the
physical disk, including the source and object code, were sold). However, a computer
program could be written (or copied, then cleverly disguised) by a potential misap-
propriator with access to a licensor's source code "without risk of infringement, so long
as the source code used to implement this function does not infringe the expression of
the source code of the pre-existing copyrighted program." Gesmer, Developments in the
Law of Computer Software Copyright Infringement, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 224, 226
(1986). In an action for software infringement, it would be very difficult for the licen-
sor/creator of the original program to prove that there was infringement unless he
could show that the infringer copied verbatim or that the copying of the idea was so
extensive or so blatant that it constituted an improper appropriation. See Arnstein v.
Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468-69 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 851 (1947).
4S Conley, supra note 18, at 582.
', Software licensors usually do not seek patent protection for their programs due
to the inherent difficulties involved with obtaining patent protection for computer
software. Under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982), a patent may be obtained to protect "any new
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter." Computer
software would appear to come under the "process" heading. However, the issue sur-
rounding software patentability is whether software is to be regarded as a mathematical
algorithm, which is not subject to patent protection, "an application thereof, which is
subject to patent protection or a non-mathematical algorithm," which is also subject to
patent protection. BENDER, COMPUTER LAW, SOFTWARE PROTECTION § 3A.01 at 3A-
2 (1988).
Generally, the test is whether a patent is sought to protect an abstract formula or a
formula that is embodied as part of a physical "structure or processs which, when
considered as a whole, performs a function which the patent laws were designed to
protect (e.g. transforming or reducing an article to a different state or thing)." Id. at
3A-2.1. Mathematical formulae, though newly discovered, are not patentable as such.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has long held that "a scientific truth, or the mathematical
expression of it, is not a patentable invention." Rejection of Computer Software, supra
note 18, at 362 n.4 (citing Mackey Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S.
86, 94 (1939)). See also Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). However, the 1981
Guidelines on the patentability of software indicate that mere inclusion of a mathemati-
cal algorithm in a claim will not render it non-statutory. BENDER § 3A.04 at 3A-47.
This requirement will eliminate most software programs from patent protection be-
cause most software programs are not part of a structure or a larger process. See Pro-
tections for Software, supra note 8, at 360.
In addition, there are several other requirements which must be met in order to
obtain patent protection. 35 U.S.C. § 102 requires that the program be "novel" or new.
35 U.S.C. § 103 requires that the program be "non-obvious." Both of these require-
ments will effectively eliminate the majority of computer programs that are submitted
for patent protection since most methods of writing a computer program are not novel,
and even in instances where the program is found novel, the claim may fail due to the
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copyright, 50 or trade secret law;51 these laws will not always ensure the
non-obviousness nature of the program. The standard for patentability is thus a strict
one. A person must develop something "not previously conceived by anyone alive."
BENDER §3A.02 at 3A-6 n.4. Most computer programs will not be able to meet this
standard since the process by which a program is designed is generally known by any-
one else "having ordinary skill in the art" of designing software programs. 35 U.S.C. §
103 (1982). At best, patent protection could be extended to the "programmable process
embodied in the computer program, or the programmed machine[,] . . . [but] . . . it is
difficult to see how it could possibly extend to the database or to documentation."
BENDER § 3A.07[2] at 3A-69.
One of the disadvantages which discourage software developers from seeking pat-
ent protection is the length of time involved in obtaining a patent. By the time the
patent is issued, often two to five years after the request is made, the program will
probably be preempted by another one. Another problem is the full disclosure that
must be made in any application. The application for patent protection "becomes a
public record, and anyone may duplicate it without a license with little chance of being
caught." Protections for Software, supra note 8, at 361. Understandably, software de-
velopers are reluctant to do this because of the relative ease with which computer pro-
grams may be copied. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text. For a more de-
tailed explanation of the advantages and disadvantages of seeking patent protection for
software programs, see BENDER § 3A.07 at 3A-68 - 3A-73.
51 See supra note 47. U.S. copyright law allows the author of a work to transfer
various rights in that work to another person, while retaining other rights for himself.
Among those rights are the exclusive rights to reproduce, prepare derivative works, and
distribute copies by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental or lease. See 17
U.S.C. § 117 (defining transfers), § 106 (enumerating the various exclusive rights in a
work) (1982). The provision dealing specifically with the limitation of exclusive rights
in computer programs is laid out at 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982).
A transfer of any of the owner's exclusive rights may be either exclusive or non-
exclusive. In the software licensing context, an exclusive transfer gives the licensee
"something comparable to title in a separable piece of the original copyright." Hemnes
& Montgomery, The Bankruptcy Code, the Copyright Act and Transactions in Com-
puter Software, 7 CoMPuTER L.J. 327, 347 (1987) [hereinafter Hemnes]. The licensee
must register with the Copyright Office, however, in order to maintain the requisite
standing to bring suit for any infringements upon his exclusive right. Hemnes points
out that if the licensee fails to register in accordance with § 205(c) of the Copyright
Act, then the trustee may avoid the license despite the exclusive nature of the transfer
under § 544(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 348 n.76. A non-exclusive license,
however, is not a complete transfer of any rights and will almost always be rejectable
by a trustee since ownership remains with the licensor. In a case involving a non-
exclusive licensee's loss of a right, though actually a privilege, in using the licensed
product, "the trustee is [merely] exercising an option the debtor had all along; the
option of defaulting." Id. at 351. For an excellent analysis of the interaction of copy-
right recordation on bankruptcy proceedings in software licensing transactions, see gen-
erally Hemnes, supra.
51 Before the enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act, trade secret protection under
state law was the primary method of protecting computer software programs. Unlike
patent or copyright law, the purpose of trade secret protection is to maintain a competi-
tive advantage in the world market. Protection may be maintained without disclosure.
Hemnes, supra at 371. However, the "element of secrecy is not lost . . . if the holder
of the trade secret reveals the trade secret to another in confidence, and under an im-
plied obligation not to use or disclose it." Kewanee Oil v. Bircon, 416 U.S. 470, 475
(1974) (quoting Cincinnati Bell Foundry Co. v. Sodds, 10 Ohio Dec. Reprint 154, 156
(Super. Ct. 1887)).
After the adoption of the 1976 Copyright Act, however, the issue of preemption of
state trade secret law and federal copyright law arose due to the conflicting policies and
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degree of protection wary licensors may want. In this light, licensor
reluctance is understandable.1
2
Licensees and licensors have attempted to strike a balance between
these interests by requiring the software's source code to be placed in
escrow. 53 However, escrow arrangements are also not entirely bank-
ruptcy-proof. In an escrow arrangement, the licensor deposits a copy of
the source code with the escrow agent-typically a bank, law firm or
computer consulting company-for the license's term." While the
source code is escrowed, the licensor must make all modifications and
updates to the deposit that are made to the original software. The licen-
sor usually retains title to the deposited source code while the code is in
escrow.
Meanwhile, the agent holds the code until the agent receives notice
that an event triggering release, such as bankruptcy or the licensor's
purposes of the two types of protection. The courts allowed the use of both forms of
protection since trade secret law protects interests that are different from those pro-
tected by copyright law. See Warrington Assocs. v. Real-Time Eng'g Sys., 522 F. Supp.
367, 369 (N.D. Ill. 1981), cited in Bender, Protection of Computer Programs: The
CopyrightlTrade Secret Interface, 47 U. Prrr. L. REv. 907, 927 (1986).
" Additionally, a licensor wishing to protect his software as a trade secret, in
order to restrict potential competition with his own product, would have to restrict
access to the source code in order to reduce the possibility of having it illegally copied
by others. Conley, supra note 18, at 582.
The licensor would also have to retain ownership of the program to ensure contin-
ued protection under U.S. copyright law. Under the first sale doctrine enunciated in §
109(a) of the Copyright Act, an owner of a copyrighted work's rights is limited after he
makes an initial distribution of a copy of that work: "the owner of a particular copy
. . . lawfully made . . . is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to
sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy .... " 17 U.S.C. § 109(a)
(1982).
" The software escrow is one of several contractual mechanisms which have been
suggested as means by which licensees can reduce their potential losses in the event of
licensor bankruptcy. Of these, the escrow arrangement has been the most commonly
used and most often discussed. See, e.g., Hemnes, supra note 50, at 354-60; Conley,
supra note 18 at 583; Pappous, The Software Escrow: The Court Favorite and Bank-
ruptcy Law, 1 COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 309 (1985); Nycum, Kenfield & Kee-
nan, Debugging Software Escrow: Will It Work When You Need It?, 4 COMPUTER
L.J. 441 (1984) [hereinafter Nycum]; Note, Third-Party Computer Leases: The Effect
of the Lessor's Bankruptcy, 6 COMPUTER L.J. 573 (1986).
" Conley, supra note 18, at 583. Conley points out that, in order for escrow
arrangements to be most beneficial for the licensee, they must meet four criteria:
First, the proprietor must deposit with the third party source code and
supporting documentation sufficient to give the user or its designee a thor-
ough understanding of the software. Second, the proprietor must update
the deposit whenever changes are made in the software. Third, a techni-
cally competent party must verify the adequacy of the proprietor's depos-
its. Finally, there must be an immediate turnover of the deposited material
to the user or its designee if the proprietor defaults on its obligations for
any reason, including bankruptcy.
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failure to update the deposit, has occurred, at which point the agent
will turn the code over to the licensee. Upon receipt of the escrowed
source code, the licensee's use of it will usually be subject to the condi-
tions laid out in the escrow agreement. These conditions, such as a
promise not to disclose the source code to unauthorized persons, will
usually be similar to those connected to the object code agreement. 5
Unfortunately, since the licensor retains title to the escrowed code, it
will most likely be retrievable by the trustee as property of the estate in
a bankruptcy proceeding. 6 Additionally, the source code would most
likely revert back into the trustee's hands by virtue of its classification
as an executory contract due to the licensor's continuing obligation to
provide periodic updates.57
In a software licensing arrangement of the type contemplated here,
the licensee is clearly at a disadvantage. So long as the licensor's busi-
ness remains financially sound, and both parties continue to meet their
contractual obligations, no problems arise for the licensee. If the licen-
sor becomes insolvent, however, the licensee's continued use may be
jeopardized regardless of attempts to protect against the effects of
rejection.
3. SECTION 365: EXECUTORY CONTRACTS
3.1 Background
Under U.S. bankruptcy law the trustee of the debtor's estate,
"subject to the court's approval, may assume or reject any executory
contract or unexpired lease of the debtor." '58 As early as 1876, the Su-
preme Court held that "[i]t has long been a recognized principle of the
bankrupt [sic] laws that the assignees were not bound to accept prop-
erty of an onerous or unprofitable character."5' 9 Broad powers to as-
sume or reject executory contracts, however, have been granted to trust-
ees through explicit statutory provisions in the Bankruptcy Code since
the mid-1930s6 ° Allowing the rejection of executory contracts relieves
5 Hemnes, supra note 50, at 355.
56 See infra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
57 For a detailed discussion of the enforceability of escrows in bankruptcy, see
Hemnes, supra note 50, at 354-60; Nycum, supra note 53, at 460.
51 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982).
" American File Co. v. Garrett, 110 U.S. 285, 295 (1884) (cited in Countryman,
Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 440 (1973) [here-
inafter Countryman, Part I].
60 Countryman, Part I, supra note 59, at 439. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 pro-
vided that the trustee could reject contracts that were "executory in whole or in part."
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 30 Stat. 544, 566, repealed by Bankruptcy Act of 1978, 11
U.S.C. §§ 1-101-151326 (1982 & Supp.).
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the debtor from the burden of continued performance and "furthers the
fundamental purpose of a reorganization under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code, which is to avoid a liquidation of the debtor's assets
and thereby preserve the jobs and economic resources created by the
debtor." '61
Although there is no statutorily established definition of what pre-
cisely constitutes an executory contract, Congress adopted Professor
Countryman's definition,62 whereby "an executory contract is one
where . . . something is to be done or not to be done by one or both
parties."6 Different circuit courts have made slight variations to this
basic definition.64 There has generally been agreement, however, as to
the definition propriety. 5 The Bankruptcy Code also does not contain
any explicit references regarding whether licensing agreements may be
considered executory contracts. Both Professor Countryman and a re-
cent line of cases66 confirm that the definition of an executory contract
is broad enough to encompass software and other types of technology
81 Tamietti, supra note 31, at 299 (footnote omitted).
82 See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 58-60, reprinted in 1978 CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5844 ("Though there is no precise definition of what
contracts are executory, it generally includes contracts on which performance remains
due to some extent on both sides.") [hereinafter S. REP. No. 989]. See also Cook,
Judicial Standards for Rejection of Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy Code Reor-
ganization Cases, 1980 ANN. SuRv. L. 689, 691; Hemnes, supra note 50, at 344.
8 See Countryman, Part I, supra note 59, at 460; Countryman, Executory Con-
tracts in Bankruptcy, Part 1, 58 MINN. L. REv. 479, 480 (1974) [hereinafter Coun-
tryman, Part II].
See, e.g., In re American Magnesium Co., 488 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1974); King
v. Baer, 482 F.2d 552 (10th Cir. 1973); Workman v. Harrison, 282 F.2d 693 (10th
Cir. 1960); In re Harms, 7 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 671 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981); In re
Brethren's Home, 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 658 (S.D. Ohio 1979); see also In re Adolphsen,
38 Bankr. 776 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1983); In re Booth, 19 Bankr. 53 (Bankr. D. Utah
1982); In re Gladding Corp., 22 Bankr. 632 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982) (Countryman
definition not the ultimate test; nature of the parties and the goals of reorganization are
determinate).
85 See, e.g., Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d
1043 (4th Cir. 1985) cert. denied sub nom. Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Canfield, 475 U.S.
1057 (1986) ("This court has recently adopted Professor Countryman's more specific
test for determining whether a contract is 'executory' in the required sense."); Gloria
Mfg. v. Int'l Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 734 F.2d 1020, 1022 (4th Cir.
1984)(court chose to apply Countryman's analysis of executory contracts in favor of
"the classic formulation by Williston"); Benevides v. Alexander, 670 F.2d 885 (9th Cir.
1982) (a deposit receipt sales agreement was deemed executory under the Countryman
definition); Fenix Cattle Co. v. Silver (In re Select-a-Seat Corp.), 625 F.2d 290 (9th
Cir. 1980) (Countryman's definition adopted by the court and applied to a software
licensing agreement) In re Fashion Two Twenty, Inc., 16 Bankr. 784, 786 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1982) ("The courts have generally accepted and applied the Countryman
definition which this Court also adopts.").
88 For a general discussion of these cases, see infra text accompanying notes 90-
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licensing agreements.6"
Software licensing arrangements usually involve a continuous rela-
tionship between the licensor and licensee, requiring performance obli-
gations from both. As a result, there is a sufficient degree of bilateral
involvement for these agreements to be considered executory, and thus
consistent with Countryman's definition. Courts have found, for in-
stance, that the "obligation to defend a patent and indemnify the licen-
see against infringement suits [satisfies] the conditions for an executory
contract." 8 Additionally, the fact "that obligations may be contingent
and never realized does not preclude a contract from being execu-
tory."'69 Once a software license is deemed executory by a court, the
trustee or debtor-in-possession may choose to reject it if the court deter-
mines subsequently that it meets one of several acceptable standards.
The trustee's ability to reject an executory contract stems from the
early decisions which permitted the abandonment of executory contracts
that were of an onerous and unprofitable nature."0 Rejection in those
cases was conditioned upon a showing by the trustee or debtor-in-pos-
session that disallowance would "cause an actual economic loss to the
estate and drain its corpus, [and] not merely be less profitable than
expected."" This burdensome test gave a substantial amount of discre-
tion to the courts and thus led to inconsistent results, depending upon
each court's definition of "burdensome." 2 As such, this standard is
"presently disfavored and not required under the Bankruptcy Code."17 8
The majority of courts now apply the business judgment test,7 4 a
less stringent standard that broadened the authority of the trustee. 5 In
67 "[Tlhere may be an implied undertaking by the licensor which brings all patent
licenses within the ambit of an executory contract ... all patentee-licensors are now
substantially in the position of having warranted their licensees the validity of their
patents. Although the sanction for the breach of such warranty is only forfeiture of
royalties rather than liability for damages, this continuing undertaking by the licensor
is enough to justify the treatment of all unexpired patent licenses as executory con-
tracts." Countryman, Part II, supra note 63, at 502.
6 Rejection of Computer Software, supra note 18, at 376.
69 Id.
70 See Countryman, Part I, supra note 59, at 440.
71 Cook, supra note 62, at 693 (citing Shanker, The Treatment of Executory Con-
tracts and Leases in the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, PRAC. LAW, Oct. 15, 1979, at 11,
20). See also In re Lafayette Radio Elecs. Corp., 8 Bankr. 528, 533 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1981).
71 See Rejection of Computer Software, supra note 18, at 379.
In re Midwest Polychem Ltd., 61 Bankr. 559, 562 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986).
'' See, e.g., Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1046-7; Robertson v. Pierce (In re Chi-Feng
Huang), 23 Bankr. 798, 801 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Leibinger-Roberts, Inc. (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 1989)(LEXIS Bkrtcy library, cases file); In re Food City, Inc., 94
Bankr. 91, 93 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988); In re Huff, 81 Bankr. 531, 537 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1988).
11 The business judgment test may have more equitable effects in practice. For
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a determination of whether rejection should be allowed, the trustee
need only demonstrate the possibility of benefit to the estate, particu-
larly the general unsecured creditors, if rejection was permitted. The
trustee's judgment has usually been upheld absent indicia that the deci-
sion was made in bad faith or in gross abuse of business discretion. 6
Under this standard, "as long as rejection is supportable as a matter of
sound business judgment, it will not be denied on the ground that the
estate can continue to realize a net financial benefit in the absence of
disaffirmance."' 7 The standard is applicable in any situation involving
the rejection of a contract that has been characterized as executory, as
its purpose is to "emphasiz[e] potential greater profit for the debtor's
estate[,]" and as such, the best and most practical approach would be to
apply a "flexible test for determining when a contract may be re-
jected.""8 Indeed, the business judgment standard has been applied in
numerous cases involving the rejection of software licensing
arrangments.
3.2 Consequences of Rejection
Upon the rejection of an executory software license, the trustee
notifies the licensee that the debtor will not continue its ongoing affirm-
ative obligations under the agreement. 79 The debtor can also prohibit
the licensee from further use of the program as provided in the agree-
ment. While the licensee cannot compel specific performance, he does
have a breach of contract claim under section 365(g) and may file a
claim for monetary damages as a general unsecured creditor.8" If the
instance, where the burdensome standard is applied, requiring a trustee to show that
the value of the estate would be significantly decreased, or present affirmative proof
that rejection will benefit the estate is overly restrictive. It also adds an element of
potential injustice to the debtor's interests. When the proceedings are held, "[i]t may be
too early to predict whether . . . [they] . . . will ultimately be successful in rehabilitat-
ing the debtor when the trustee is faced with the decision of which executory contract
will be assumed and which rejected." Control Data Corp. v. Zelman (In re Minges,
602 F.2d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1979). The burdensome standard also dilutes greatly the scope
of the trustee's power to effectively manage the debtor's estate. As a result, it could
"cause injustice to the debtor and contravene the very purpose of the bankruptcy laws,
which is to benefit the debtor's estate to the fullest extent possible." Nimmer, Executory
Contracts in Bankruptcy: Protecting the Fundamental Terms of the Bargain, 54 U.
CoLO. L. REv. 507, 529 (1983).
78 H.R. REP. No. 1012, supra note 17, at 5.
77 Cook, supra note 62, at 696. See also In re Minges, 602 F.2d at 42, 43 (2d
Cir. 1979).
18 Rejection of Computer Software, supra note 18, at 380 (citing In re Minges,
602 F.2d at 43).
79 Drabkin, supra note 39, at 12-30. See also In re Select-a-Seat Corp., 625 F.2d
at 292-93.
so 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (1982). Section 365(g) provides, in relevant part, "the rejec-
[VOL. 11:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol11/iss1/3
BANKRUPTCY. SOFTWARE LICENSING
trustee chooses, he can re-license the software program to the licensee
at a higher price or resell the software program to a new licensee.
If the licensee has entered into an escrow agreement, his ability to
claim the source code upon bankruptcy could be restricted even if the
arrangement provided for the licensee's access upon bankruptcy. The
trustee could reclaim the source code from the escrow agent under sec-
tion 542(a),"' which requires that any entity in possession, custody, or
control of property of the estate 2 must turn it over to the trustee. The
property must be returned "wherever located and by whomever
held."8" If the escrowed source code constituted property of the estate,
"the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction [extends] both to the physical prop-
erty represented by the medium bearing the code (tape, disk, etc.) and
the intellectual property embodied in the code."' " Thus, the escrow
agent could be compelled to turn over its copy of the source code to the
trustee upon demand. 5
The automatic stay provision, section 362, can also prevent a li-
censee from taking any action to obtain an escrowed source code.88
Under this provision, a filing for protection under the bankruptcy laws
acts as an automatic stay of any action against the licensor or any act to
obtain possession of or control over any property belonging to the licen-
tion of an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor constitutes a breach of
such contract or lease." See also Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1048 ("Under 11 U.S.C. §
365(g), Lubrizol would be entitled to treat rejection as a breach and seek a money
damages remedy; however, it could not seek to retain its contract rights in the technol-
ogy by specific performance even if that remedy would ordinarily be available upon
breach of this type of contract.").
81 11 U.S.C. § 542(a) (1982). This section provides, "[An entity other than a
custodian, in possession, custody, or control, during the case, of property that the trus-
tee may use, sell, or lease. . . , or that the debtor may exempt. . . shall deliver to the
trustee, and account for, such property or the value of such property, unless such prop-
erty is of inconsequential value or benefit to the estate."
I See supra note 81.
8 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1982).
8, Conley, supra note 18, at 589 n.59.
85 While section 542 requires an individual, including the escrow agent, in posses-
sion of property of the estate to turn it over to the trustee, there is one exception by
which a licensee might obtain the source code and avoid section 542. Under the exclu-
sion in section 542(c), "an entity that has neither actual notice nor actual knowledge of
the commencement of the case concerning the debtor may transfer property of the estate
• ..in good faith . . . to an entity other than the trustee, with the same effect . . . as
if the case . . . concerning the debtor had not been conmnenced." 11 U.S.C. § 542(c)
(1982). Thus, a licensee could "notify the escrow agent that a delivery condition has
occurred" without informing the agent that bankruptcy proceedings had been com-
menced. Nycum, supra note 53, at 462. The responsibility of notification would then
fall upon the licensor. Id.
6 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982).
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sor's estate."7 A licensee who violates the automatic stay8" could be held
in contempt of court.89
These provisions added further risk to the licensees' position by
closing the channels by which injured parties to a contractual arrange-
ment could customarily seek relief. Such injury is considered justifiable
in the bankruptcy context; however, it is a particularly harsh result for
technology licensees due to the unique nature of intellectual property.
4. LUBRIZOL AND ITS AFTERMATH: A THREAT TO THE
LICENSING MECHANISM?
Although the business judgment standard has eased the burden of
trustees seeking to reject executory contracts, it has not permitted rejec-
tion in every instance. An examination of the cases addressing the abil-
ity to reject technology licenses illustrate that courts have been amena-
ble to a balancing of the interests involved and consideration of the
consequences of rejection upon the parties. The courts have not upheld
a trustee's business decision to reject as a rule of thumb. The Fourth
Circuit's decision in Lubrizol produced an unfortunate result. There is
no clear indication, however, that the Lubrizol result would have be-
come the norm in all software and technology licensing bankruptcies.
The following survey of cases will begin with a brief examination of
two of the leading cases decided prior to Lubrizol. While they do not
necessarily involve technology licenses, their rationales are relevant, and
87 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a)(1)-(2) (1982).
88 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(d)-(f), however, provide a procedure by which a licensee
could be excused from the automatic stay after a notice and a hearing. Under sections
362(d)(1) and (2), a court may grant relief for cause, such as "the lack of adequate
protection of an interest in property of such party in interest;" or if either the debtor
does not have an equity in the property or if the property "is not necessary to an
effective reorganization."
Under section 362(e), the stay will be terminated as to the party requesting termi-
nation thirty days after a request for relief unless the court "orders such stay continued
in effect pending, or as a result of, a final hearing and determination."
Under section 362(0, the court must grant a request for relief from an automatic
stay "as is necessary to prevent irreparable damage to the interest of an entity in prop-
erty, if such interest will suffer such damage before there is an opportunity for notice
and a hearing."
89 Conley, supra note 18, at 592 (citing In re Holland, 21 Bankr. 681, 689
(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1982)). If a party is found in contempt, that party's "lack of knowl-
edge the pendency of the proceeding is not a defense." Nycum, supra note 53, at 456.
In In re Holland, the creditor was held in contempt of court after receiving notice
of the debtor's discharge from his obligations under bankruptcy law yet refusing to
deliver monies in violation of section 362's automatic stay. The creditor was required to
pay the debtor the monies it had retained pursuant to payroll deductions after the
petition date, plus any accrued interest. In addition, the creditor was required to pay
costs of instituting the suit and attorney's fees. In re Holland, 21 Bankr., at 689.
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their consideration is warranted for their precedential value in subse-
quent cases.
4.1 Pre-Lubrizol
Several courts in the cases prior to Lubrizol generally supported a
balancing of the interests in a determination of whether rejection would
benefit the general unsecured creditors. 90 In an early case arising under
the Bankruptcy Act, In re Minges,91 the Second Circuit alluded to the
propriety of using a balancing test by noting that a bankruptcy court
must exercise its discretion fairly "in the interest of all who have had
the misfortune of dealing with the debtor." 2 The court in In re Chi-
Feng Huang, a case involving the rejection of an executory contract to
sell the debtor's apartment, further expanded this concept." In deter-
mining potential benefit to unsecured creditors, the court indicated that
"this may involve a balancing of interests." ' It relied on the Second
Circuit's reasoning in In re Minges to assert the propriety of disallow-
ing rejection in cases where the damage to the non-rejecting party
would be disproportionate to any benefit to be derived by the estate's
general unsecured creditors. 5 Rejection, however, would not be sanc-
tioned merely "because of a generalized concern that a party whose
contract is rejected will be damaged."96
In 1983, the court in In re Petur adopted this rationale in disal-
9* See, e.g., Turbowind, Inc. v. Post Street Management, Inc. (In re Turbowind,
Inc.), 42 Bankr. 579 (Bankr. S.D. Ca. 1984).
91 602 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1979).
92 Id. at 43.
" In re Chi-Feng Huang, 23 Bankr. 798 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982). The issue there
focused upon the debtors' most valuable asset, an apartment complex which had been
sold to appellee. Appellee had paid no part of the purchase price nor taken possession
of the complex at the time debtors filed for protection under Chapter 11. While the
appellee attempted to seek relief from automatic stay, the trustee of the estate responded
by seeking to reject the contract. Id. at 799.
94 Id. at 801.
9' Id. The trial court in this case disallowed rejection on the ground that it would
primarily benefit the two debtors and not the creditors. This conclusion was based on
the belief that "each estate [was] solvent and that most of the unsecured claims sched-
uled in the case [were] 'questionable' debts owing to friends or relatives of the debtors
or to The Kaleidoscope [a corporation owned and run by the debtors]." Id. at 799-800.
The court found this reasoning to be erroneous because the reasoning assumed that a)
"questionable" claims were invalid, and b) benefits to friends or relatives inured to the
debtors. The court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for further consid-
eration. Id.
" Id. at 801. Damaged expectations of a licensee also do not constitute sufficient
grounds for disallowing rejection: "Any rejection will inevitably entail the disappoint-
ment of legitimate expectations. A basic policy of the Bankruptcy laws is to spread the
burdens evenly among those who may have loaned the debtor money and those who
might have obtained a profit from dealing with him." Id.
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lowing the rejection of a licensing agreement despite the fact that the
debtor had properly exercised its business judgment in seeking rejec-
tion.9 7 The twenty-year licensing agreement entered into between the
debtor licensor, Petur U.S.A., and the licensee, Petur of Canada, was of
an executory nature, involving continuing obligations from both par-
ties."8 While Petur of Canada's business was immensely successful,
Petur U.S.A.'s business showed a continuous and significant loss. Petur
U.S.A. therefore sought to terminate the licensing agreement, claiming
that it was the most significant cause of its financial problems.99
According to the court, a bankruptcy court was a court of equity
and as such, it could not authorize rejection where its effect would be
the "actual ruination of an otherwise profitable, successful and ongoing
business."' 00 It considered the effects of rejection on both-licensor and
licensee10 1 and ultimately concluded that the losses associated with the
destruction of Petur of Canada's business far outweighed any benefits
to the debtor's estate.
4.2 Lubrizol
Lubrizol involved a non-exclusive licensing agreement to use a
metal coating process owned by Richmond Metal Finishers (RMF)
which was RMF's most valuable asset. Under the agreement the licen-
9 In re Petur U.S.A. Instrument Co., 35 Bankr. 561 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1983).
*8 Petur U.S.A. and Petur of Canada entered an agreement whereby Petur of
Canada was granted the exclusive right to use, manufacture, assemble and sell Petur
U.S.A.'s products. In addition, it would provide Petur of Canada with monthly consult-
ing services and the relevant techniques and know-how. Lastly, Petur of Canada re-
ceived the right to purchase the components from its licensor at a percentage of the
production cost as well as the right to use Petur U.S.A.'s trademark. Petur of Canada,
in return, paid Petur U.S.A. an up-front fee of $100,000 for the license and a royalty
of three percent of all future gross sales derived from the license. Id. at 562.
:9 The debtor maintained that rejection would allow it to benefit from the pro-
ceeds it would receive from the Canadian market. It projected that sales in Canada
would yield $200,000 to $280,000 in profits annually. Id.
100 Id. at 564.
101 The Petur court considered five factors in reaching its conclusion:
First, it is not evident that the debtor will be able to reorganize, even if
allowed to reject the contract. Second, more than 120 days have elapsed
since this Chapter 11 case was filed, and as yet the debtor has not pro-
posed a plan of reorganization. Third, ... the profits that the debtor
envisions are only projections based on little, if any, experience in the Ca-
nadian market. Fourth, there is no evidence of any new capital coming
into the debtor. Fifth, the evidence indicates that Petur of Canada has
been effective in retailing in the Canadian market and has shown consis-
tent profits over the last four years. There is no evidence indicating a re-
verse of this trend in the future and it is doubtful if the debtor would be
able to do better.
Id. at 564.
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sor, RMF, was required to notify and defend Lubrizol in the event an
infringement action was brought, to notify Lubrizol of any other use or
licensing of the process and to reduce the royalty fee accordingly if an-
other licensee paid a lower rate, and to indemnify Lubrizol for any
losses arising from misrepresentation or breaches of warranty by
RMF.' °2 In return, Lubrizol was required to account for, and to pay
royalty fees for, the use of the process. RMF filed for bankruptcy pur-
suant to Chapter 11, and sought the court's approval to reject the li-
censing agreement in order to pursue a more profitable arrangement
with a new licensee.103
The Fourth Circuit allowed rejection, reversing the decision of the
district court. 04 The court found the contract executory as to both par-
ties, reasoning that "[t]he un-performed, continuing core obligations of
notice and forbearance in licensing made the contract executory as to
RMF."'' 5 The fact that RMF's duty to give notice and to defend in
infringement suits was contingent did not preclude the contract from
being executory. The court noted, "[U]ntil the time has expired during
which an event triggering a contingent duty may occur, the contingent
obligation represents a continuing duty to stand ready to perform if the
contingency occurs. '  Also, the continuing obligations connected with
the licensee's royalty obligation were sufficient to render the contract
executory as to Lubrizol.
The court proceeded to determine whether rejection would be ad-
vantageous to the debtor by applying the business judgment test, re-
maining conscious of the fact that "in corporate litigation the rule is
that courts should defer to-should not interfere with-decisions of
. . . directors except upon matters entrusted upon a finding of bad
faith or gross abuse of their 'business discretion.' "o107 Upon a consider-
ation of the unrebutted facts presented in the record,' 08 it found the
10' Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1045.
103 Id.
104 The district court's decision was based on two factors: first, that RMF's obli-
gations under the license were not onerous enough to make relief a substantial benefit
to it, and second, because deprivation would strip Lubrizol of all its rights, rejection
could not be found beneficial. Id.
105 Id. at 1045.
108 Id. at 1046.
107 Id. at 1047. See infra notes 120-25 and accompanying text.
108 The court noted that the evidence as presented to the trial court was not rebut-
ted by Lubrizol. This unrebutted evidence was that:
The metal coating process subject to the licensing agreement is RMF's
principal asset and that sale or licensing of the technology represented the
primary potential source of funds by which RMF might emerge from
bankruptcy. The testimony of RMF's president, also factually uncontested
by Lubrizol, indicated that sale or further licensing of the technology
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debtor's decision to reject the contract to be based on sound business
judgment and, therefore, approved the rejection.'0 9
The court indicated that Lubrizol could be compensated for the
loss of its licensed right by seeking a monetary damages remedy under
section 365(g).110 It expressly noted although rejection was to be treated
as a breach of contract, the legislative history of section 365(g) indicated
that the "purpose of the provision is to provide only a damages remedy
for the nonbankrupt party." ' Even though it was acknowledged that
such allowance of rejection could act as a disincentive upon the willing-
ness of licensees to enter into license agreements with businesses that
were financially unstable, the court felt that such a result was justifia-
ble under the bankruptcy laws." 2
4.3 Post-Lubrizol
Despite the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in Lubrizol,
many courts continued to follow the directive of In re Chi-Feng Huang
and In re Petur, declining to apply the harsh Lubrizol rule."' In the
1986 case In re Logical Software, Inc.,""4 the appellate court reversed
the decision of the district court to allow rejection. The licensor, Logical
Software, Inc., maintained a business of exclusively developing, licens-
ing and maintaining computer software. Logical Software's two princi-
pal products, LOGIX and Softshell software, and its rights to license
their use, constituted its principal assets." 5 The licensee, Infosystems
would be facilitated by stripping Lubrizol of its rights in the process and
that, correspondingly, continued obligation to Lubrizol under the agree-
ment would hinder RMF's capability to sell or license the technology on
more advantageous terms to other potential licensees.
756 F.2d at 1047.
109 RMF's president indicated that "sale or further licensing of the technology
would be facilitated by stripping Lubrizol of its rights in the process and that, corre-
spondingly, continued obligation to Lubrizol under the agreement would hinder RMF's
capability to sell or license the technology on more advantageous terms to other poten-
tial licensees." This fact was uncontested by Lubrizol. Id.
.10 Id. at 1048. See also supra note 80.
"1 756 F.2d at 1048 (emphasis added). The court concluded that "[a]llowing spe-
cific performance would obviously undercut the core purpose of rejection under §
365(a), and that consequence cannot therefore be read into congressional intent." Id.
But see Nimmer, supra note 75, at 529.
112 The court stated: "[U]nder the bankruptcy law such equitable considerations
may not be indulged by courts in respect of the contract here in issue. Congress has
plainly provided for the rejection of executory contracts, notwithstanding the obvious
adverse consequences for contracting parties thereby made inevitable." 756 F.2d at
1048.
113 See, e.g., Bregnan v. Meehan (In re Meehan), 59 Bankr. 380 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1986).
114 66 Bankr. 683 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986).
115 Id. at 684.
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Technology, Inc. (ITI) was the sole possessor of an exclusive license."' 8
It received a copy of the source code and, under the terms of the agree-
ment, was permitted to "modify that code and market the resulting pro-
gram under the name LOGIX or another name."11 ITI modified the
source code, developed its own software and subsequently marketed the
new product to its customers under the name RUBIX. ITI's entire op-
erations focused upon RUBIX, providing ITI with 100% of its profits.
Due to longstanding disputes between the two parties and endless law-
suits, the licensor filed for bankruptcy pursuant to Chapter 11 and
sought to reject the license.118
The court asserted that the bankruptcy court had "adopted an er-
roneous legal standard when it applied the Lubrizol test to the ques-
tion." ' 9 It therefore remanded the case, directing the bankruptcy court
to apply the balancing test adopted by the courts in cases such as In re
Chi-Feng Huang and In re Petur, and to disallow rejection if ITI
would be damaged disproportionate to any benefit the general un-
secured creditors would derive. "[T]he Bankruptcy Court," it in-
structed, "may want to consider the probable size of ITI's damage
claim against Logical if rejection is allowed, Logical's likelihood of re-
organizing, and the extent of damage to ITI's business caused by
rejection."12
A similar result was also reached in In re Midwest Polychem,
Ltd.,"' where the bankruptcy court declined to authorize the rejection
of a license after balancing the equities involved: "This court believes
that it is appropriate to always consider the equities of the situation
and measure the relative effects of rejection before granting
approval." '22
Although a number of recent cases have permitted rejection, those
courts generally acknowledged that a balancing of the equities was an
element that should come into play when applying the business judg-
116 Id.
117 Id. at 685.
18 Id. In seeking rejection, ITI argued that the injury resulting to its business
would far outweigh any advantages which might be produced by allowing rejection.
ITI indicated that the potential loss to its business would fall somewhere between $14.4
million and $62.5 million, as opposed to the periodic royalty fee of $10,000 which
Logical Software would forfeit. Id. ITI also claimed that the burdens which would be
inflicted upon Logical Software were too insignificant to satisfy the burdensome test.
Id. at 686.
"' Infosystems Tech., Inc. v. Logical Software, Inc., No. 87-0042 at 3 (D. Mass.
June 25, 1987)(WESTLAW, Fed. library, Bankr. file).
120 Id.
121 In re Midwest Polychem, 61 Bankr. 559 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986).
122 Id. at 562.
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ment test. The court in In re Southern California Sound Systems12
permitted rejection but stated that an important factor to be considered
was "the size of the claim flowing from the breach caused by rejec-
tion."124 It determined that the size of the claim in that case would be
minimal: the licensor, Southern California Sound Systems (SCSS), was
not a business with employees, was not producing anything at the time
of the suit, had not yet made any sales, and thus had no accounts re-
ceivable. 2 5 It also had no assets to undertake a reorganization plan.
Lastly, since SCSS had only formed several months before it filed
under Chapter 11, the court concluded that "the relatively small un-
secured debt cannot be seriously delinquent, if indeed, any delinquency
exist[ed] at all."' 2 6
It should be noted, however, that rejection was based primarily
upon a factor unique to the case: evidence in the record indicating that
SCSS's filing was clearly executed in bad faith. 27 Thus, regardless of
12 In re Southern California Sound Systems, Inc., 69 Bankr. 893 (Bankr. S.D.
Cal. 1987).
124 Id. at 896.
125 Id. at 897.
126 Id. The record indicated that SCSS's schedules reflected unsecured debts of
$107,770,000, consisting mostly of insider and unsecured loans. However, if the 15-
year licensing agreement was fully performed, the potential value of the contract was
calculated to be $78,570,000, as gross sales were estimated to be about $5,328,000 an-
"nually. In addition, the licensor's schedules reflected assets of $67,456. Thus, "exclud-
ing insider loans, debtor's schedules indicate that more than sufficient assets exist to
pay all unsecured creditors in full." Id. at 896.
127 Id. at 898. In this case, SCSS had entered into a licensing arrangement with
the licensee, Starburst Marketing International, Inc. (SMI), in order to broaden public
exposure to its new loudspeakers. SMI was granted an exclusive license to sell loud-
speakers produced by SCSS in an arrangement similar to that in Logical Software. Id.
Under the terms of the agreement, SMI was required to purchase 80% of all loud-
speakers produced by SCSS, and was then permitted to sell all loudspeaker units and
exclusive rights to any trademarks worldwide. Additionally, SCSS agreed to grant SMI
a license of the patent to SMI in the event SCSS was unwilling or was unable to
produce enough loudspeakers to fill SMI's needs. In return, SMI was to pay SCSS a
royalty of 6% on every loudspeaker unit sold. Disputes between the parties ensued
immediately after the licensing arrangement was concluded and, upon failing to obtain
investors to finance the production of loudspeakers, SCSS sought to cancel the licensing
agreement. SMI brought an action against SCSS for breach of contract seeking $6
million in damages. SCSS retaliated by filing under Chapter 11. Id. at 895.
The record included a statement by the president of SCSS indicating that the case
was filed for the sole purpose of rejecting a burdensome contract. The declaration of
Ronald Vale, president of SCSS, stated:
The debtor filed this case for the purpose of rejecting a burdensome con-
tract; to gain the protection offered by the automatic stay provisions under
the Code; to buy time after the rejection, to solicit funding for its projects
and to thereafter propose and complete a successful plan of reorganization.
Without the continued protection of this court, the debtor will expire and
the time efforts, monies and energies expended by the principals of SCSS
over these past years will all have been for naught.
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the inequities involved with permitting or disallowing rejection, the
court declared where "the true purpose of filing a petition [was] other
than to reorganize a financially distressed business," and "to merely
take advantage of one of the remedies available under the Code, dismis-
sal is appropriate in order to protect the jurisdictional integrity of the
Court." 2 '
The court did express approval of the In re Logical Software ra-
tionale, but it distinguished that case from SCSS."' Unlike SCSS, Log-
ical Software had been operating a business for five years before filing
for bankruptcy. It was "a real company with real debt and real credi-
tors to enforce it."' 0 Although the relationships between the parties in
the two cases were similarly marked by discord, Logical Software had
made attempts to resolve its disputes with ITI before it sought to reject
the contract. 31 Lastly, Logical Software's decision to reject, unlike
SCSS's, indicated nothing more than "the exercise of its sound business
judgment as but one step towards successful reorganization." '
Some courts expressed uncertainty regarding the appropriateness
of a bankruptcy court's indulging in equitable considerations where the
rejection of a technology license was concerned, but nevertheless en-
gaged in a balancing of sorts. The discussions in In re Chipwich,
Inc.13' and In re Laser Disc Computer Systems, Inc., 3 ' did not ex-
pressly sanction the balancing approach, yet alluded that rejection
might have been disallowed had there been some factual indicia that
rejection would have resulted in damage to the licensees that would be
disproportionate to the possible benefits to the general unsecured credi-
tors. Both courts referred to and distinguished In re Petur. The bank-
ruptcy judge in Laser Disc, for instance, distinguished the case by not-
ing that "the Petur Instrument Court expressly based its decision on
five factors, none of which exist here." ' 5 Likewise, in Chipwich, there
was no showing that the licensee would be damaged disproportionately
as in Petur.3 6
This brief survey indicates that the threat from Lubrizol was cer-
tainly not a clear one; in fact, doubt has been raised as to the correct-
Id. at 898.
128 Id. at 900.
129 Id. at 899.
230 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 54 Bankr. 427 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
134 No. 85-00535, slip. op. (D. Mass. Oct. 8, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library,
Bankr. file).
135 Id. at 3. See also In re Chipwich, Inc., 54 Bankr. at 431.
136 54 Bankr. at 431.
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ness of the decision itself.137 Given time, the balancing test would have
most likely settled the problems that persisted in cases involving the
rejction of software and other technology licensing agreements.138
Nonetheless, the fears of the computer industry were able to convince
Congress that the need for relief to this dilemma was immediate.1"9
5. THE SOLUTION: THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BANKRUPTCY
PROTECTION ACT
5.1 The Congressional Response
On August 7, 1987, Senators DeConcini (D-Ariz.) and Heflin (D-
Ala.) introduced S. 1626,140 the Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Pro-
tection Act of 1987, in response to concerns from the computer industry
regarding the potentially detrimental effects of the Lubrizol decision. It
was feared that the wide discretion courts allowed licensors and their
trustees to reject a technology licensing agreement in the event of bank-
ruptcy would "effectively sound a death knoll [sic] for the small busi-
ness dependent on intellectual property for the success of its opera-
tion. '1 41 Uncertainty surrounding the present state of the law, noted
DeConcini, "jeopardizes American technology licenses in the world
market."
42
In his introductory remarks to S. 1626, Senator DeConcini stated
that at the time the present Bankruptcy Code 43 was considered for
137 See H.R. 4657, supra note 26, at 67, 71 (testimony and statement of George
A. Hahn).
'" George Hahn, on behalf of the National Bankrutpcy Conference, indicated
that the balancing test was, in fact, "the preferable test and ... more reasonable test."
Id. at 103 (testimony by George A. Hahn). He noted: "I think ultimately the courts
will adopt [it]. I think there is a general tendency slowly gathering momentum in that
general direction, which will take several years. I believe that if it can be worked out by
the courts, it's better being left with the courts rather than to be legislated." Id. at 100.
13' See, e.g., id. at 93, 96, 99.
140 S. 1626, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REc. 11,653-55 (1987) (Intellec-
tual Property Bankruptcy Protection Act).
141 Id. at 11,654. See also Senate Bill Would Protect Technology Licensees If
Licensor Goes Bankrupt, 34 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 378 (August 13,
1987).
142 S. 1626, supra note 140, at 11,654.
143 U.S. bankruptcy law was first designed and effectuated in 1898 and was re-
vised in 1938. However, changes in the nature of debtor-creditor law, the adoption of
the Uniform Commercial Code in the 1960s, and an increasing number of bankruptcies
eventually made revisions to the 1938 Bankruptcy Code a necessary step towards mod-
ernization. S. REP. No. 989, supra note 62, at 2-3. In 1970, a commission was created
by Congress "to study and recommend changes in bankruptcy laws." Id. at 1. A two-
part report was completed in 1973, consisting of the commission's findings and recom-
mendations and a draft bill implementing those recommendations. Id. at 1-2.
After extensive hearings and numerous redraftings throughout 1975 and all of
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revisions in the early 1970s, Congress did not address this issue "be-
cause no courts had considered it before the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978 and because it requires the application in bankruptcy cases of the
very specialized area of intellectual property law. 11 44 It was concluded
that this "quirk" in the bankruptcy law must therefore be remedied in
order to preserve U.S. competitiveness in the world technology
market.
1 45
S. 1626 proposed an amendment to section 365 which would allow
software and other technology licensees to retain use of licensed intel-
lectual property after the licensor files for bankruptcy and rejects the
contract. 146 A trustee who rejected the contract would be relieved of his
performance obligations under the contract, but be prohibited from tak-
ing any action to deprive or interfere with the licensee's use of the li-
censed material. S. 1626 included two exceptions to this general provi-
sion: a) where the licensing involved trademarks, the licensee was
required to comply with the licensor's ongoing quality assurance pro-
gram;147 and b) where the licensee is the bankrupt party and the con-
tract required the licensee to maintain the confidentiality of trade
secrets, rejection would not relieve the debtor licensee of its obligation
to maintain confidentiality. 48 Similar legislation, known as the Intel-
1976 by the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery, the House version
of the bill (H.R. 8200) was passed on February 1, 1978. Id. at 2. The Senate version,
S. 2266, was introduced by Senators DeConcini and Wallop on November 1, 1978.
The bill was passed after a series of hearings and revisions that took place over a five
month period. Id.
144 S. 1626, supra note 140, at 11,654.
145 Id.
146 S. 1626, supra note 140, at 11,654-55 (§ 365(n)(1)-(3)).
147 Id. § 365(n)(2) provides, in relevant part:
[T]he trustee may not interfere with the grantee's rights . . .(C) in the
case of a trademark, trade name, service mark, or similar intellectual
property, to permit existing grantees to continue in concert the quality
assurance procedures of the licensor. If the trustee rejects such a contract
or lease, the trustee is relieved only from the specific performance of pro-
spective obligations thereunder measured from the filing date and is pro-
hibited from taking any action which would interfere with the grantee's
rights ....
148 Id. § 365(n)(3) provides:
(3) If the debtor was the grantee under an executory contract or unexpired
lease which granted rights in intellectual property, prior to assumption or
rejection and notwithstanding rejection of such contract or lease, the trus-
tee, the debtor, and the grantor must maintain the confidentiality of any
protected information obtained pursuant to the executory contract or
unexpired lease to the extent required by applicable nonbankruptcy law.
Prior to assumption or rejection, the grantor is entitled to adequate assur-
ance of the continued confidential treatment of such protected information.
If the contract or lease is rejected, upon request by the grantor including
an offer of reimbursement of expenses, all materials embodying protected
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lectual Property and Bankruptcy Bill (H.R. 4657), was also introduced
in the House by Representative Don Edwards (D.-Cal.) on May 23,
1988. H.R. 4657 was based on a draft bill submitted by George A.
Hahn on behalf of the National Bankruptcy Conference which was
supported by other groups, including the American Bankruptcy Insti-
tute and the American Bar Association's Business Bankruptcy Commit-
tee. 49 Instead of adding a new section to section 365, the draft bill
expanded the existing provisions of section 365(h), allowing the tech-
nology licensee to elect to retain the intellectual property, and specifi-
cally lists the forms of intellectual property to be protected. "5
H.R. 4657 was modeled after section 365(h)(1),' which pertains
to the rejection of an unexpired lease of real property.1" 2 Unlike section
365(h)(1), however, the bill did not allow the licensee any right of set-
off. 5 ' And, unlike S. 1626, H.R. 4657 did not include the exemptions
pertaining to trademark licensees or licensees under disclosure agree-
information shall be returned to the grantor. The trustee, after he has
received actual notice of the existence of the protected information in the
bankruptcy estate, and the debtor, are not, by reason of the rejection, per-
mitted to disclose protected information without the consent of the person
to whom the obligation of confidentiality is owed.
"1 In the fall of 1987, after S. 1626 was proposed, the Bankruptcy Licensor Coa-
lition was formed. The Coalition consisted of representatives from U.S. industries. The
Coalition approached the National Bankruptcy Conference for its support and assis-
tance with regard to S. 1626. During the winter of 1987 representatives of the Confer-
ence and the Business Bankruptcy Committee of the American Bar Association held a
series of meetings to discuss the ramifications of S. 1626. The Conference chose to assist
with the bill for three reasons: 1) it recognized the potentially harmful effects of the
Lubrizol decision; 2) it was skeptical about the propriety of the Fourth Circuit's ruling
in Lubrizol (in particular, its interpretation of the consequences of rejection); and 3) it
felt a responsibility to see that any amendments to section 365 would be based on sound
bankruptcy principles.
The representatives found that the provisions of S. 1626 were ambiguous and that
it "did not reach a satisfactory balance between the needs of debtor licensors of intellec-
tual property on the one hand and the concerns of licensees on the other." H.R. 4657,
supra note 26, at 71 (statement of George A. Hahn). From the meetings and discus-
sions that were held that winter, the Draft Bill, which is the precursor to H.R. 4657,
resulted. Id. at 72.
08 Hearing on S. 1626 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Administrative
Practice of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) (statement of
George A. Hahn, Esq., Hahn & Hessen on behalf of the National Bankruptcy Confer-
ence) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 1626]; Technology Licensing and Bankruptcy Are
Considered by Senate Subcommittee, 36 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 172,
190-91 (June 16, 1988) [hereinafter Technology Licensing and Bankruptcy
Considered].
11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(1) (1982).
182 Technology Licensing and Bankruptcy.is Considered by House Subcommittee,
36 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 141, 143 (June 9, 1988).
1" Under section 365(h)(i), the lessee-in-possession may reduce the amount of
rent paid by the amount of damages incurred by lessor's non-performance of the lease.
Id. at 142.
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ments. 1" The House Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial
Law heard testimony on H.R. 4657 on June 2, 1988. While the panel
members agreed that legislation was necessary to remedy this prob-
lem, "5 there was concern expressed over certain ambiguities in the pro-
posal, as well as over the possibility that it favored the licensee too
heavily. 56
Testimony on DeConcini's bill, S. 1626, was heard on June 10,
1988, at a hearing of the Senate Subcommittee on Courts and Adminis-
trative Practice. Like those present at the hearings on H.R. 4657, the
participants in the Senate hearings acknowledged the need for legisla-
tion in this area and that the DeConcini bill was a good starting point.
154 Id.
155 Four witnesses testified at the hearing: James Burger, Esq., of Apple Com-
puter, Inc., testifying on behalf of the Computer and Business Equipment Manufactur-
ers Association and the Bankrupt Licensors Coalition; Harry F. Manbeck, Esq., of
General Electric Company, testifying on behalf of Intellectual Property Owners, Inc.;
George A. Hahn, Esq., of Hahn & Hessen, testifying on behalf of the National Bank-
ruptcy Conference; and Thomas M.S. Hemnes, Esq., of Foley, Hoag & Eliot. H.R.
4657, supra note 26, at 13.
156 Mr. Thomas M.S. Hemnes, Esq. opposed the bill, arguing that "[iut would
create substantial inequities by abrogating the fundamental contract principle of mutu-
ality of obligation. It would interfere with the reorganization of debtors by making it
practically impossible for a trustee to reject a wide variety of executory contracts that
Lubrizol has not affected. It would, finally, jeopardize trade secret protection presently
available for intellectual property." Id. at 29 (testimony of Thomas M.S. Hemnes,
Esq.).
In place of the proposed bill, Mr. Hemnes presented several alternatives to the
Committee. First, he suggested that no amendment be added at all in order to give
bankruptcy courts more time to devise a method of accommodating technology licenses.
Second, he suggested modeling an amendment on 11 U.S.C. § 1113, which protects
collective bargaining agreements. An amendment based on section 1113 would require
a court to balance the interests of the licensor with the licensee before allowing rejec-
tion. It would also permit the licensee to continue the technology until an adequate
replacement could be found. Third, Hemnes suggested giving licensees an option of
retaining nonexclusive rights which are tied to its obligation to pay and protect the
technology. Id.
A suggestion was also offered by Mr. Manbeck, concerning the definition of intel-
lectual property in section 1(a) of the bill. As proposed, he felt that the definition in
H.R. 4657 could be clarified or made more explicit as to what intellectual property was
covered. He suggested that specific reference be made to each form of intellectual prop-
erty in order to avoid any possible confusion as to what rights were covered. Id. at 88
(statement of Harry F. Manbeck, Esq.). As proposed in H.R. 4657, § 1(a) provided:
(52) 'intellectual property' means-
(A) trade secret;
(B) invention, process, design, or plant variety;
(C) work of authorship; or
(D) mask work subject to protection under chapter 9 of title 17; to the
extent protected by applicable nonbankruptcy law; and
(53) 'mask work' has the meaning given it in section 901(a)(2) of title 17.
Id. at 3.
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Several objections, however, were raised to S. 1626.157 The National
Bankruptcy Conference's draft bill was also presented as an alternative
to S. 1626 and was favorably received by the industry leaders
present.
158
Although the draft bill found enthusiastic support, the Senate Sub-
committee on Courts and Administrative Practice chose instead to adopt
a substitute version of S. 1626 at the August 9, 1988 markup session.
159
The markup version incorporated the suggestions offered at the previ-
ous hearings and was essentially identical to the draft bill, the primary
difference being that the substitute added a new section to section 365
which dealt with intellectual property licensees in a separate provi-
sion. 60 The Subcommittee unanimously approved the substitute
amendment and, on the next day, it was unanimously approved by the
full Committee on the Judiciary. On September 22, a markup session
of its House counterpart, H.R. 4657, was held by the Subcommittee on
Monopolies and Commercial Law. The Subcommittee adopted a sub-
stitute H.R. 4657 which was essentially the same, but included some
technical clarifications." 1 Representative Don Edwards introduced this
1"' Technology Licensing and Bankruptcy Are Considered by Senate Subcommit-
tee, supra note 150, at 172-73. George A. Hahn, testifying on behalf of the National
Bankruptcy Conference, laid out its primary objections to S. 1626 as proposed. The
objections of the National Bankruptcy Conference were:
a) The definition of intellectual property was too imprecise. Concern
was expressed that the inclusion of trademarks, trade names and service
marks in the definition would "bring every retail franchise involving a
trademark within the purview of the legislation, thus extending the reach
of the bill far beyond what appears necessary";
b) The bill did not adequately address the problems concerned with
continuing quality assurance for trademarks in the bankruptcy context;
c) The provisions which assured continued confidentiality were al-
ready addressed by 11 U.S.C. § 107(b);
d) The provision requiring debtor licensees to maintain confidential-
ity to the extent required by applicable nonbankruptcy law could be mis-
takenly interpreted as "prohibiting the debtor from revealing information
to his trustee in bankruptcy, thereby interfering with the trustee's ability
to operate the debtor's business; and
e) The bill did not adequately assure that the debtor would continue
to receive royalty payments.
Hearing on S. 1626, supra note 150 (statement of George A. Hahn, on behalf of the
National Bankruptcy Conference).
158 Technology Licensing and Bankruptcy Considered, supra note 150, at 173.
159 Senate Judiciary Committee Approves Bill on Technology Licensing and
Bankruptcy, 36 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 404 (Aug. 18, 1988).
160 Id.
1"1 The clarifications made by the Subcommittee were: 1) the definition of intel-
lectual property was clarified to include intellectual property protected under federal
patent and copyright laws; 2) the amendment stated on its face that a licensor is bound
by contractual provisions that give a licensee exclusive rights; and 3) the amendment
stated that a licensee is bound to continue making royalty payments. H.R. REP. No.
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new amendment in the form of a clean bill, H.R. 5348, which was
approved on September 27, 1988, by the Committee on the Judiciary.
S. 1626 was passed by a unanimous Senate on September 20, 1988,
after technical additions were made. S. 1626, along with its House
counterpart, H.R. 5348, was passed by the House on October 4,
1988."2 S. 1626 was signed into law on October 18, 1988."63
5.2 The Provisions
The Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Protection Act amends sec-
tion 365 of the Bankruptcy Code by adding a new section, section
365(n), which consists of four subsections. 6 The amendment deals
only with the situation where the licensor is the bankrupt party and
rejects or terminates his software or other technology licensing agree-
ment with the licensee. The first subsection gives the licensee an option
to either treat the rejection as a breach of contract or to retain his rights
to use the contract as stipulated under the licensing agreement. 65 If the
licensee chooses the first option, the licensee may treat the contract as
terminated and seek redress under section 365(g) of the Bankruptcy
1012, supra note 17, at 1-2.
16 See House Passes Legislation on Technology Licensing and Bankruptcy, 36
Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 631 (Oct. 13, 1988); Senate Passes Legislation
on Bankruptcy and Licensing, 36 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 549 (Sept.
22, 1988). See also, Miller, Computer Firms Win Bid to Plug Legal Loophole, Wall
St. J., Oct. 6, 1988, at B5.
16 See President Signs Legislation on Technology Licensing and Bankruptcy, 36
Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 741 (Oct. 27, 1988).
16 Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 100-506, 102
Stat. 2538 (1988) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 365).
"6 Id. Amended section 365(n)(1) provides:
(n)(1) If the trustee rejects an executory contract under which the debtor
is a licensor of a right to intellectual property, the licensee under such
contract may elect -
(A) to treat such contract as terminated by such rejection if such re-
jection by the trustee amounts to such a breach as would entitle the licen-
see to treat such contract as terminated by virtue of its own terms, applica-
ble non-bankruptcy law, or an agreement made by the licensee with
another entity; or
(B) to retain its rights (including a right to to [sic] enforce any exclu-
sivity provision of such contract, but excluding any other right under ap-
plicable non-bankruptcy law to specific performance of such contract)
under such contract and under any agreement supplementary to such con-
tract, to such intellectual property to the extent protected by applicable
nonbankruptcy law, as such rights existed immediately before the case
commenced, for -
(i) the duration of such contract; and
(ii) any period for which such contract may be extended by the licen-
see as of right under applicable nonbankruptcy law.
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Code""6 as an unsecured creditor.16 7 If the licensee chooses to retain his
rights to the intellectual property, 6" he may retain his rights as well as
any embodiment thereof under the licensing agreement and any agree-
ment supplementary to it.'16 The licensee may also enforce any exclu-
sivity provision where applicable1 7 1 for the remainder of the contract's
term 71 and any period for which it may be extended as of right. How-
ever, the licensee cannot compel specific performance.1
72
168 See supra note 80.
'e' Pub. L. No. 100-506, § 1(b) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1)(A)).
l The new defined term "intellectual property" under section 365(n) includes:
(A) trade secret;
(B) invention, process, design, or plant protected under title 35;
(C) patent application;
(D) plant variety;
(E) work of authorship protected under title 17; or
(F) mask work protected under chapter 9 of title 17; to the extent
protected by applicable nonbankruptcy law ....
Id. § 1(a). This definition of intellectual property is designed to broadly encompass all
forms of intellectual property which are already protected by applicable non-bank-
ruptcy law. S. REP. No. 505, supra note 21, at 7. One unique aspect of this definition
is its inclusion of trade secrets, which is usually addressed by state law. However, this
is considered appropriate given its application in the bankruptcy context: "[B]ecause
bankruptcy processes can alter rights created by state law, this inclusion is appropri-
ate." Id.
169 This contemplates the situation where, for instance, the licensor has deposited
a copy of a licensed program's source code to an escrow agent. Where the licensor and
licensee have entered into an escrow agreement, stipulating that the source code would
be handed over to the licensee upon the occurrence of a triggering event, the licensee
would retain his rights in both the licensed object code as well as the source code. The
source code constitutes the "embodiment" of the licensed intellectual property, and the
escrow agreement which laid out the licensee's rights thereto constitute the "agreement
supplementary" to the contract. See S. REP. No. 505, supra note 21, at 9-10.
170 See Pub. L. No. 100-506, § l(b) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(n)(1)(B),
(n)(2)(A)).
..1 Rights which the licensee may retain are those which existed at the time the
licensor filed for bankruptcy. See S. REP. No. 505, supra note 21 at 8. The Senate
Report to S. 1626 indicates that the licensee is "entitled to use the underlying intellec-
tual property in the state that it existed on the day of the bankruptcy filing as provided
in the license and . . . is entitled to any judicial relief necessary to enforce that set of
rights." Id. at 9.
172 This provision is intended to relieve the licensor of any performance obliga-
tions, such as maintaining or updating computer software, that may be impractical for
the trustee. See id. In addition, this provision is intended to minimize the burdens on
the debtor licensor: "Future affirmative actions . . . could deplete the bankrupt estate
at the expense of the general creditors-while trying to reorganize or make a fresh
start." H.R. REP. No. 1012, supra note 17, at 8. However, it does not relieve the
debtor of "performing" covenants which do not require action by the trustee, such as
permitting the licensee to continue using the software if the licensee chooses to retain.
Id. at 8-9.
The exclusivity provision is the one exception where the licensee may compel spe-
cific performance from the licensor. Where the license granted the licensee an exclusive
right to use the technology, then the licensee, under § 365(n)(1)(B), may enjoin the
licensing of the rights which were granted to the licensee. Id. at 8. See also S. REP. No.
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The second and third subsections present modifications upon the
licensee's rights should it elect to retain the licensed material. The sec-
ond subsection instructs the trustee to allow the licensee to continue
exercising his rights to the technology where the licensee has chosen to
do so.178 In return, the licensee must continue to make royalty pay-
ments to the licensor for the duration of the contract.'" However, the
licensee waives any rights of setoff he might otherwise have, as well as
any allowable claim for administrative expenses against the estate
under section 503(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.17' This is intended to aid
the licensor in his efforts to reorganize. Allowing offset or administra-
tive expenses could defeat the right to royalty payments.17 6
The third subsection compels the trustee, upon the written request
of the licensee, to provide the technology and any embodiment of the
technology to the licensee as provided for in the licensing agreement or
a supplementary agreement.17 7 The trustee is directed to not interfere
with the licensee's rights to use the technology or with efforts by the
licensee to obtain the technology or its embodiment from another
party. 17  This effectively precludes the trustee from attempting to pre-
505, supra note 21, at 9.
171 Pub. L. No. 100-506, § 1(b) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 365(a)(2)(A)).
174 Id. As codified, section 365(n)(2)(B) provides: "(B) the licensee shall make all
royalty payments due under such contract for the duration of such contract and for any
period described in paragraph (1)(B) of this subsection for which the licensee extends
such contract." The House Report notes that in determining what payments are to be
deemed royalties, courts should "look to the substance of the transaction and not the
label. The underlying nature of the payments must be considered." H.R. REP. No.
1012, supra note 17, at 9. For example, if payments which are based on a percentage
of the profits derived from the use of the licensed material are provided for in the
licensing agreement, then the payments should be treated as royalties regardless of the
label affixed thereto. See id.
'" Id. As codified, section 365(n)(2)(C) provides: "(C) the licensee shall be
deemed to waive-(i) any right of setoff it may have with respect to such contract
under this title or applicable nonbankruptcy law; and (ii) any claim allowable under
section 503(b) of this title arising from the performance of such contract."
176 S. REP. No. 505, supra note 21, at 10. The licensee that chooses to retain its
rights to the technology still has a general claim for damages arising from the rejection
under section 365(g). As the House Report notes, though, any claim for damages is
likely to be relatively small where the licensee chooses to retain, as compared with a
choice to treat the rejection as a breach of contract under section 365(n)(1)(A). H.R.
REP. No. 1012, supra note 17, at 8-9.
Pub. L. No. 100-506, § 1(b). As codified, section 365(n)(3)(A) provides:
(3)If the licensee elects to retain its rights, as described in paragraph
(1)(b) of this subsection, then on the written request of the licensee the
trustee shall-
(A) to the extent provided in such contract, or any agreement supplemen-
tary to such contract, provide to the licensee any intellectual property (in-
cluding such embodiment) held by the trustee.
178 Id. As codified, section 365(n)(3)(B) provides: "[Tihe trustee shall. . .(B) not
interfere with the rights of the licensee as provided in such contract, or any agreement
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vent the licensee from obtaining, for instance, the escrowed source code
of a licensed software program from an escrow agent.
The last subsection describes the duties of a trustee in the period
prior to the license's rejection. Unless and until the trustee rejects, he
must either continue to perform the contract or provide the licensee
with the licensed technology."19 Furthermore, the trustee must not in-
terfere with the licensee's rights to the technology or to obtain the tech-
nology or any embodiment thereof from another party during this
period.19 °
6. ANALYSIS OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BANKRUPTCY
PROTECTION ACT
Theoretically, section 365(n) should preserve the United States'
competitive position in the world technology market by eliminating a
major element of uncertainty for licensees engaging in software licens-
ing transactions. By striking a balance between the interests of licensors
and licensees, it is intended to allow foreign licensees to feel more se-
cure with the knowledge that their interests would be protected in the
event of licensor bankruptcy when they engage in software licensing
agreements with U.S. licensors. Also, as licensing transactions become
more reciprocal in nature, section 365(n) will ease the fears of U.S.
companies that will be licensing from foreign licensors in the United
States. Section 365 renders licensing a practical no-risk situation for a
licensee since the licensee no longer needs to be overly concerned with
the possibility of losing his business or licensed rights if the licensor
become insolvent. However, by focusing too heavily on the plight of the
licensee, the drafters of section 365(n) failed to strike the aforemen-
tioned balance between licensor and licensee in several respects.
6.1 General Effects
A primary flaw in the amendment is the failure of the drafters to
fully consider its potential effects upon the rights of an insolvent licen-
sor. Not every rejection will result in irreparable damage to the licen-
see. By taking the reins out of the licensor's hands and putting them
into the hands of the licensee, section 365(n) assumes in all cases that
rejection of a technology licensing agreement will irreparably harm the
supplementary to such contract, to such intellectual property (including such embodi-
ment) including any right to obtain such intellectual property (or such embodiment)
from another entity."
179 Id. (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(4)(A)).
I d. (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(4)(B)).
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licensee and that the interests of the licensee should, therefore, prevail
over the licensor's interest in reorganizing. 81
Any licensee that chooses to retain his rights under the license is
required to continue making royalty payments to the licensor as pro-
vided under the agreement.18 ' This, however, is no consolation to the
licensor, who could have benefitted more had he been able to terminate
an unprofitable license altogether and re-license those rights to a new
licensee. If a percentage of the licensee's profits are handed over to the
licensor, the licensor may not be disadvantaged unjustly if the licensee's
activities are highly profitable, unless a higher percentage could be ob-
tained from another licensee. However, if the licensee was only re-
quired to pay, for example, a yearly fee of $20,000, the licensor loses if
the licensee's business is reaping millions of dollars in profits annually.
Of course, depending upon market demand, a set fee may yield more
revenue to a licensor and, thus, be a more favorable alternative. On the
other hand, if the set fee were substantially lower than the percentage
fee that could be obtained from the current or a new licensee, the licen-
sor would benefit greatly if he could reject the license or renegotiate the
terms of the existing licensing agreement. Under applicable contract
principles, the licensor and licensee are free to renegotiate the terms of
the agreement if and when both sides agree to do so. However, under
the protection of section 365(n), any incentive for the licensee to rene-
gotiate is minimal, leaving the licensor with few options.
The extent to which the licensee must continue to fulfill his af-
firmative obligations under the license is another area of uncertainty
under section 365(n).' 81 Section 365(n)(1)(B) relieves the licensor of all
performance obligations other than allowing the licensee to retain its
rights under the license. On the other hand, while the licensee is specif-
ically required to continue making royalty payments under section
365(n)(2)(B), the amendment is silent as to the licensee's remaining
affirmative obligations. It has been presumed that under the license
agreement the licensee will have to continue fulfilling his obligations,
with the exception of those which are dependent upon the licensor's
cooperation. 4 However, because this is an ambiguous point, there is
much room for misinterpretation. The statute could be interpreted to
only require that the licensee continue making royalty payments. Rejec-
181 H.R. 4657, supra note 26. In arguing that the amendment as proposed was
overbroad, Hemnes indicated that in most types of licensing transactions, "outright ter-
mination of the non-bankrupt party's right to use licensed technology is unlikely to be
fatal to the licensee." Id. at 36 (testimony of Thomas M.S. Hemnes).
181 Pub. L. No. 100-506, § 1(b) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(2)(B)).
181 See H.R. 4657, supra note 26, at 36 (testimony of Thomas M.S. Hemnes).
184 Id. at 106 (statement of George A. Hahn).
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tion could then be used as a defense, by claiming that the licensor's
rejection rendered the agreement unenforceable, thus leaving the
debtor-licensor without a remedy for the licensee's noncompliance with
the remaining terms of the licensing agreement." 5 Conceivably, a licen-
see that obtains the software program's source code from the escrow
agent can decipher it to determine how it functions. Once this has been
achieved, an adventurous licensee could make improvements or substan-
tial alterations in the program."" The licensor may be left with no
remedy against such misappropriation."'
Section 365(n) also conflicts with certain aspects of copyright law.
The licensor may reject the contract, but if an exclusive licensee chooses
to retain under section 365(n), the licensor cannot regain his technology
for the term of the license. By allowing a licensee to retain his rights,
regardless of his exclusivity and solely at his own option, the amend-
ment overlooks the interests of the licensor in controlling the disposition
of its invention.
The amendment, therefore, has several ramifications. First, it
defeats the purpose of recording a transfer under the Copyright Act.
The grant of an exclusive license constitutes a transfer of copyright
ownership."8 " Prior to the enactment of section 365(n), if the exclusive
software licensee duly registered the copyright, his rights in the pro-
gram could have been protected against rejection under the Copyright
Act." 9 However, the rights of a non-exclusive licensee, or of an exclu-
188 Id. at 35-36. (testimony of Thomas M.S. Hemnes).
188 See supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
187 This potential issue was addressed by counsel, Gary Goldberger, during the
hearings on H.R. 4657. In response, George A. Hahn, who testified on behalf of the
National Bankruptcy Conference, admitted that there was nothing in the amendment,
as then proposed, which explicitly addressed the question of what happened to the
licensee's other contractual duties. He stated that "the courts will have to deal with that
and it should be left for the courts to deal with it." H.R. 4657, supra note 26, at 106.
Another witness, Marilyn Shea-Stonum, expressed concern over addressing this issue in
detail and cautioned against creating an incentive for trustees to reject contracts. For
instance, if a licensor knew that by rejecting, it could escape performing its duties yet
be assured of continued performance from the licensee, it could have its cake and eat it
too. Id. at 107. In response to a suggestion posed by Thomas Hemnes that the licen-
see's obligation to share improvements go forward, she indicated, "We found that some-
what ironic, that the person who hasn't breached the contract would be required to
share post-petition improvements, when the bill explicitly relieves the person who has
breached the contract from sharing its post-petition improvements. I think this is an
area where the courts ought to do some work." Id.
188 Under the 1976 Copyright Act, transfer of ownership includes "an assignment,
mortgage, exclusive license, or any other conveyance, alienation, hypothecation of a
copyright or of any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, whether or not it is
limited in time or place of effect, but not including a nonexclusive license." 17 U.S.C. §
101 (1982).
18' See Hemnes, supra note 50, at 354; 17 U.S.C. § 205(e) (1982).
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sive licensee that failed to register the transfer, would have been subject
to avoidance under the Bankruptcy Code."'0 Amended section 365(n)
treats all licensees the same, regardless of whether their rights were
exclusive or non-exclusive, or whether the transfers were registered or
unregistered. This works an injustice to licensors who are rendered
powerless to dispose of their technology, even where no transfer has
been effected legally due to the licensee's failure to register.
This brings us to a second point: the purpose of copyright protec-
tion. That purpose is to foster creativity and new ideas by providing a
mechanism by which the manifestation of those ideas may be protected
from misappropriation. Its effectiveness in promoting "the progress of
science and the useful arts by securing for limited times to authors and
inventors the exclusive rights to their respective writings and discover-
ies"""1 may be diluted if creators lose faith in the ability of the copy-
right laws to protect their creations. Although section 365(n) seeks only
to preserve the licensee's rights as laid out in the licensing agreement
for the term of the contract, and does not attempt to divest the licensor
of its copyrights, dilution may occur inadvertently. For instance, a
software licensee who has opted to retain his rights in a licensing agree-
ment that has fifteen years remaining before termination has ample
time in which to alter the program, assuming the licensee is in posses-
sion of the source code. If the licensee manages to escape performing
any contractual provisions requiring sharing improvements to the pro-
gram with the licensor, the licensor will not benefit from the improve-
ments. Additionally, if there was any illegal misappropriation, it will
be difficult for the licensor to prove in court.192
Finally, section 365(n) contravenes the fundamental policy under-
lying U.S. bankruptcy law to aid in the debtor's reorganization and
treat all creditors equitably.19 As discussed previously, the amendment
fails to acknowledge or simply fails to consider the scenario in which
the licensor's estate would benefit from rejection. This is especially true
where assumption of the contract as originally drafted would be overly
burdensome for the debtor to assume. This problem is further aggra-
vated by, the failure of section 365 to distinguish among the various
types of licensing arrangements. While the exclusive licenses may be
the ones that licensees most need to retain, due to their uniqueness and
the difficulty in finding a replacement, exclusive licenses are also most
likely to constrain the debtor's efforts at reorganization, particularly
':0 Hemnes, supra note 50, at 354; 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (1982).
"9 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, c. 8.
192 See supra note 18 at 582 n.12.
193 See H.R. REP. No. 1012, supra note 17, at 2.
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where the technology is the debtor's most valuable asset.' 94 Nonethe-
less, protection of a licensee's rights where they are exclusive is at least
understandable. In many instances, however, there will most likely be
an adequate replacement available for the licensee. In these situations,
rejection should be allowed.
6.2 The International Business Effects
Although the maintenance of the United States' competitive advan-
tage in the computer software industry was one of the primary factors
which prompted reform, section 365(n) may not produce the desired
result. While the amendment's application will allow domestic and for-
eign licensees to feel secure entering licensing agrements with software
licensors, licensors may not feel equally comfortable. This is due, in
part, to the inability of licensors to revoke a licensee's right to continue
using the licensed program under the terms of the agreement, even
where doing so would be crucial to aiding the debtor's efforts to reor-
ganize. Although section 365(n) will similarly affect domestic and in-
ternational licensing involving domestic intellectual property, the nega-
tive effects may be more apparent in the international arena due to the
interest in maintaining U.S. competitiveness in the computer industry.
Hence, despite the logical expectation that section 365(n) will make
licensing a more attractive opportunity for all licensees, and thereby
encourage technology flow, this objective may not be achieved if there is
reluctance on the part of potential licensors.
Increased reluctance on the part of licensors may result from fear
of losing control over the disposition of their technology upon bank-
ruptcy and the possible consequences flowing from this loss of control,
especially if the licensee is a potential foreign competitor. For instance,
despite provisions to maintain confidentiality, a licensee could nonethe-
less continue to reap financial rewards from the licensed software by
developing, manufacturing and marketing new products in its subsidi-
aries abroad.' Of course, the same scenario is equally possible in a
purely domestic transaction. In this latter situation, however, the licen-
sor has a greater degree of control and ease in monitoring a licensee's
activities on a regular basis.'96 The complications that arise in the in-
ternational context, such as obtaining evidence in an action and secur-
ing recognition for the licensor's product, would be minimized in a do-
mestic action. Thus, while a foreign licensee continues to profit from
19 H.R. 4657, supra note 26, at 40 n.13 (testimony of Thomas M.S. Hemnes).
195 See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
.98 See supra note 39.
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the licensor's creation, the licensor is forced to suffer the consequence of
having attempted to increase his own expertise in the field or in licens-
ing his ideas or products to foreign parties in need of basic know-how.
Placing the weight of the risks entirely on the licensor may thus
decrease the attractiveness of entering into international license agree-
ments. Because there are numerous potential licensees in the United
States, there may not be a substantial loss to a software licensor who
chooses not to engage in foreign licensing. This assertion is buttressed
by the fact that small start-up businesses and individual licensors do
not have the financial resources necessary to extensively monitor and
maintain a licensed software product that is located overseas.197 At the
outset, individual licensors are primarily interested in finding a licensee
who will be willing to test a new idea which may or may not go any-
where. After balancing the speculative nature of such an endeavor-the
additional time and costs involved and the lost opportunities that may
result from avoiding foreign licensing-the safest route may be to avoid
them altogether if equally attractive opportunities exist domestically.
Ironically, section 365(n) was designed with the purpose of protecting
the smaller businesses, as those are the ones in need of protection. 98
While the possibility of bankruptcy is not a point dwelled upon in most
business ventures, the uncertainties and continuous fluctuations of the
computer industry render the consideration of such possibility a reason-
able one.
In the international context, it is probably unlikely that licensing
activities will decrease markedly because of the economic necessity for
the U.S. software industry to engage in reciprocal licensing with tech-
nologically advanced nations such as Japan. Software licensors can
minimize their risks from these uncertainties by taking the necessary
contractual precautions. For instance, licensors could refuse to grant a
licensee access to the source code under any circumstances, or refuse to
place the source code into escrow. Licensors can lease out software pro-
grams for shorter terms, renewable upon the end of the term. Section
365(n) will not eliminate the need to devise innovative methods of pro-
tecting a technology client's interests. The amendment only reverses the
positions of licensor and licensee, with the dilemma now in the licen-
sor's hands rather than the licensee's.
7. CONCLUSION
The injustices that the rejection of a software or other technology
197 Id.
"I8 See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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licensing agreement can inflict upon a licensee were relevant issues that
needed to be addressed. They were also issues of questionable immedi-
acy. Had the courts been permitted to further refine the judicial balanc-
ing test without legislative interference, these problems might have been
alleviated on their own. Nonetheless, the industry fears, which stemmed
largely from the Fourth Circuit's decision in Lubrizol, were able to
push through Congress an amendment which may not prove to be the
cure-all it was intended to be.
The Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Protection Act does not
strike the desired balance between the interests of a licensor and licen-
see to a software licensing agreement. By allowing licensees the option
to retain their licensed interests in software in every situation where
rejection has been approved by a court, section 365(n) allieviates the
problems of the licensee by inadvertently creating burdens for the licen-
sor. Furthermore, it conflicts with fundamental policies underlying
U.S. bankruptcy and copyright laws.
The effects of section 365(n) are presently unknown, as the provi-
sion has been in effect for only a short time. From this brief analysis,
however, it is reasonable to speculate that additional fine-tuning of the
amendment may be in store. Additional fine-tuning should create a
more balanced approach by accounting for the interests of both licensor
and licensee without sacrificing the rights of either party. Without some
modifications by the legislature or creative interpretation by the courts,
section 365(n) may create a disincentive for licensors to enter licensing
agreements. Rather than remedying the software licensing dilemma,
section 365(n) could still have a potential chilling effect on software
licensing transactions and do nothing to improve U.S. competitiveness
in technology.
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